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AIR FORCE WOMEN'S ACCESS TO ABORTION SERVICES
AND THE EROSION OF 10 U.S.C. § 1093
MARSHALL L. WILDE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Military women in general, and Air Force women in particular,
face significantly more restrictions on their access to abortion
services than their peers without military affiliation.1 Regulatory
restrictions, funding issues, local laws, and the potential
unavailability of services in the local community all present
obstacles to an airman or family member seeking an abortion.
Federal law prohibits funding for abortion services for both active
duty and military family members except in cases where the
woman's life is at risk or the pregnancy results from rape or incest.2
Despite a regulatory requirement mandating referrals, military
treatment facilities do not have referral guidelines.3 Air Force
commanders have tremendous discretion in determining when to
allow leave, even medical leave, giving them an effective veto over
abortion in some locations. Finally, the woman must find a facility
willing to perform the abortion, a significant problem given the
geographic remoteness of many Air Force facilities and the
potential hostility of host nation laws.4 As a consequence, Air Force
women suffer wide disparities in their access to abortion when
compared with their civilian counterparts.
* Captain, United States Air Force Reserve, 433 AW/JA, Lackland AFB, Texas,
J.D.-University of Oregon, 1997, LL.M. student, University of Houston Law Center, Health
Law, 2002-2003. The author would like to thank Prof. Joan Krause of the Health Law and
Policy Institute at the University of Houston Law Center for her invaluable assistance.
1. As used in this paper, "Air Force women" encompasses both women in the Air Force
and women who are military family members. While this article focuses on the Air Force,
the federal laws discussed apply equally to all the services. The Civilian Health and Medical
Program Uniformed Service (CHAMPUS) regulations cited apply equally to all military
family members. The Air Force Instructions (AFI) cited apply only to the Air Force, but the
other services have similar regulations.
2. See e.g. Continuing Appropriations, Pub. L. No. 99-591, 100 Stat. 3341 (1987);
Department of Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 98-525, 98 Stat. 2492 (1985);
Continuing Appropriations, Pub. L. No. 98-107, 97 Stat. 733 (1984); District of Columbia
Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-530, 94 Stat. 3121, 3127-28 (1980); Departments of Labor
and Health, Education, and Welfare, Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-439, 90 Stat. 1418
(1977); Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-189, § 114, 87 Stat. 714 (1973).
3. In the Air Force, for example, the requirement is in the AFI regulations. AFI 44-102,
§ 2.10.7, (Nov. 17, 1999) Community Health Management, at http://www.e-
publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/44/afi44-102/afi44-102.pdf.
4. A "host nation" is a foreign country where the United States stations troops.
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A significant aspect of the problem is that many, if not all, Air
Force medical facilities lack referral procedures for abortion
services, despite a regulatory requirement that they have such
procedures.' Should an active duty military woman choose to have
an abortion, she must request leave, which her commander has no
obligation to grant. She must then find a facility willing to perform
the abortion, although the Air Force may have stationed her in a
county or state that has no abortion services or prohibits abortions
entirely. A similarly situated civilian woman in the United States
has the option of requesting either a medical or surgical abortion
directly from her provider or obtaining a referral to a provider or
facility that will provide such services. Even a clinic that provides
family planning advice to the poor under Title X,6 a woman will be
informed that the clinic can only provide pre-conception services
and should receive a referral to a physician who will be obligated to
provide a complete range of options to the woman.7
Recent federal district court decisions have eroded the
prohibition on the use of federal funds for abortions for military
family members, but will probably not extend abortion funding
beyond payments for therapeutic abortions in cases of anencephalic
fetuses.' The recent cases of Britell v. United States9 and Doe v.
United States1" expanded coverage of abortion services to military
women carrying anencephalic fetuses by invalidating the Civilian
Health and Medical Program Uniformed Service (CHAMPUS)
regulations that prohibited such funding as lacking a rational
basis." Those courts held that protection of potential life could only
5. The requirement is in AFI 44-102, § 2.10.7, Community Health Management (Nov.
17, 1999), at http://www.e-publishing.af.milpubfiles/af/44/afi44-102/afi44-102.pdf. The lack
of anywritten guidelines is per my review ofAFPUBS conducted December 2, 2002, available
at Air Force Publishing, http://www.e-publishing.af.mil. It is further supported by
acknowledgements by the physicians interviewed for this paper that no such referral
procedures exist.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 300-300a-6 (2003).
7. This is required by common law principles of informed consent and the Am. College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. See Code of Prof. Ethics of the Am. C. of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists, at http://www.acog.org/from-home/acogcode.pdf (last visited Apr. 4,2003)
(providing the general requirement that obstetricians and gynecologists present their
patients with options and consequences of treatment).
8. An anencephalic fetus suffers from a developmental flaw that causes it to fail to form
large portions of the brain. For more information see National Institute of Neurological
Disorders and Stroke Anencephaly Information Page, http://www.ninds.nih.gov/health-and-
medical/disorders/anencephaly-doc.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
9. Britell v. United States, 204 F. Supp. 2d 182 (D. Mass. 2002).
10. Doe v. United States, C02-1657Z, (W.D. Wash. 2002) (unpublished) (order granting
Plaintiffs Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order).
11. 32 C.F.R. § 199(e) (2003). CHAMPUS is administered through the managed care
program TRICARE.
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serve as a rational basis for a denial of funding when some potential
for life outside the womb exists.12 The courts will probably not
require funding for abortions except for cases of anencephaly or
other fetal conditions that cause immediate postnatal death, despite
support in the medical community for broadening the policy to
include therapeutic abortions.
This paper argues that the Air Force should take affirmative
steps to ensure access to abortion services. The conservative nature
of Air Force commanders and physicians, as well as unfriendly host
nation laws, impair the exercise of a woman's constitutional right
to abortion services. By enacting regulatory protections, such as
requiring commanders to grant leave to pregnant women seeking
to terminate a pregnancy and extending the emergency leave
program definitions to include termination of pregnancy, the Air
Force can protect the reproductive rights of women.13
II. ABORTION RIGHTS AND FUNDING IN THE CIVILIAN CONTEXT
Abortion rights and abortion funding law developed through
two separate lines of cases. The Supreme Court distinguished the
right to terminate a pregnancy from the government's decision not
to provide funding for the exercise of those rights. The Court has
consistently upheld a woman's right to choose to have an abortion
with few restrictions early in the pregnancy. The Court also has
given great deference to legislative decisions to not provide funding
for abortions. 14 These two lines are worth examining separately.
A. Privacy Background Cases-Roe through Casey
Although we often think of Roe v. Wade 5 as the seminal
abortion law case, the legal underpinnings of Roe were developed a
decade earlier in Griswold v. Connecticut.6 In Griswold, the
Supreme Court held that married women had the constitutional
right to obtain birth control, despite a Connecticut law prohibiting
12. Britell, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 198.
13. See generally AFI 36-3003, Military Leave Program (Apr. 14, 2000) (detailing
procedures and requirements for granting leave), available at http://www.e-
publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/36/afi36-3003/afi36-3003.pdf.
14. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,
492 U.S. 490 (1989); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977).
15. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
16. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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it. 7 Justice Douglas enunciated a "privacy right" arising from the
"penumbras" of other constitutional guarantees."8
A later case, Eisenstadt v. Baird, expanded the right to
contraception to single people.19 The Court found the guarantees of
the Constitution were not strictly limited, but rather applied to
diverse situations to "give them life and substance."2 At the time,
the states generally outlawed abortion, although it was still
generally accessible for wealthy women.2'
Roe v. Wade involved three sets of plaintiffs.22 Jane Roe, a
pregnant single woman, lived in Dallas County, Texas, where
abortion was illegal.23 She sued the District Attorney, challenging
the constitutionality of the abortion prohibition.24 The Court
permitted Dr. James Hallford, a Texas physician with two pending
abortion cases, to intervene.25 A married, childless couple, the
Does, also sued, alleging injury based on the future possibilities of
contraceptive failure leading to pregnancy, lack of preparedness for
parenthood, and impairment of the wife's health. 26 The Does,
however, eventually were dismissed from the case because their
injury was too speculative.
In crafting the 'majority opinion that overturned the
prohibitions, Justice Blackmun examined the history of abortion
and legal limitations on the practice.2" Justice Blackmun noted the
recently recognized liberty interests surrounding the right to
privacy, and concluded that the right to privacy necessarily
included abortion.29 He also found that the state had a compelling
interest in preserving fetal life that could override such a decision.3"
After the first trimester, however, the state could only impose such
restrictions as were necessary to preserve and protect maternal
health.3 ' Embracing the idea of "quickening" at the start of the
17. Id. at 485-86.
18. Id. at 483-84.
19. 405 U.S. 438, 460 (1972).
20. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
21. David J. Garrow, Abortion Before and After Roe v. Wade: An Historical Perspective,
62 ALB. L. REV. 833, 834 (1999).
22. Roe, 410 U.S. at 120-121.
23. Id. at 120.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 121.
27. Id. at 129.
28. Id. at 136-1129-50.
29. Id. at 154.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 163.
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third trimester, Justice Blackmun found that the state could then
prohibit abortion.32 The decision left first trimester abortion
decisions to the woman and her physician, allowed some
interference by the state to preserve the woman's health in the
second trimester, and recognized a compelling state interest in the
preservation of potential life in the third trimester, except when the
abortion was necessary to preserve the health of the mother. 33 The
Court concluded that the Texas statute prohibiting all abortions
was therefore unconstitutional.34
That same year, the Supreme Court decided Doe v. Bolton,35
invalidating a Georgia statute prohibiting abortion 36 except in the
cases of a threat to the life of the mother, 37 a fetus with grave,
permanent and immutable birth defects,38 or when the pregnancy
was the result of rape.39 Mrs. Doe, a pregnant indigent woman, had
requested an abortion on the grounds that she was economically
unable to care for her current children.4" In fact, two of her children
had been removed from the home, and it was likely that she would
be unable to care for a new child. 1 The Court struck down the
statute's prohibition on elective abortion, as well as other
restrictions that: limited abortions to accredited hospitals; required
consultation with a hospital abortion committee; and required two
additional physicians to confirm the attending physician's opinion
regarding the clinical necessity of the abortion. The Court did
uphold the statute's requirement that the physician find that the
abortion was "necessary" in his or her best clinical judgment,
holding that this requirement actually benefited the woman
without unduly burdening her right to abortion.43 While not
expanding the privacy doctrine, the opinion did provide more
guidance on its application.
Many state legislatures opposed the decisions in Roe and Doe,
and moved quickly to restrict access to abortion. In particular,
Missouri passed a statute defining viability, requiring the written
consent of the woman and the woman's spouse during the first
32. Id. at 163-64.
33. Id. at 164-65.
34. Id. at 163-64.
35. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
36. Id. at 201.
37. Id. at 183.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 183.
40. Id. at 185.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 192-99.
43. Id. at 191-92.
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twelve weeks of pregnancy, requiring a physician performing an
abortion to exercise professional due care to preserve the life and
health of the fetus regardless of its viability, holding the physician
liable for failing in that duty, requiring the written consent of one
parent for unmarried minors, prohibiting saline amniocentesis as
a method of abortion, and imposing recordkeeping requirements for
facilities and physicians performing abortions.44 A case contesting
the constitutionality of the statute inevitably made its way to the
Supreme Court, which had anticipated the arrival of these
"secondary issues" involving abortion rights.45
In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, the Court issued a mixed
decision on the Missouri statute. It upheld the statute's definition
of viability, finding that it only confirmed that viability was a
medical decision based upon the facts available to the physician at
the time.46 As Roe contemplated the same determination of
viability, the Court found no conflict between Roe and the statute.
To the extent written informed consent procedures are common for
medical procedures, the Court found the consent requirement was
not unduly burdensome to a woman seeking an abortion.4' The
majority also upheld the recordkeeping requirements as reasonably
directed toward the preservation of maternal health, in that they
were confidential and used to ensure the facility's compliance with
medical safety regulations.49
The Court, however, struck down the spousal consent provision,
the parental consent provision, the prohibition on saline
amniocentesis, and the requirement that a physician use due care
to preserve the life of the fetus." Justice Blackmun, again writing
the majority opinion, wrote that the state could no more grant a
woman's husband veto power over abortion than it could exercise
such power itself.5 Under the same reasoning, the state also could
not require parental consent for unwed minors.52 While saline
amniocentesis was the method used in seventy percent of all United
States abortions and was safer than many (but not all) other
techniques, the majority felt that Missouri's attempt to outlaw the
44. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 84-89 (1976) (providing the
complete text of the Act).
45. Id. at 55.
46. Id. at 64.
47. Id. at 65.
48. Id. at 67.
49. Id. at 80.
50. Id. at 70, 74, 79, 83-84.
51. Id. at 69-70.
52. Id. at 74.
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practice was no more than an arbitrary restriction on the right to
abortion.5 3 The Court held that the state could not require a
physician to provide care to a non-viable fetus, as it was not a child
and essentially has no life or health to preserve.54 After Danforth,
the Court did not substantially address abortion for several years,
preferring to rule only on funding issues and to make minor
interpretations of the Roe framework.
In 1991, the Supreme Court put forth its current view on
abortion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.55 Casey, another mixed
decision, addressed a Pennsylvania law with five relevant
provisions.56 First, the law required "a woman seeking an abortion
give her informed consent prior to the abortion procedure, and
specifies that she be provided with certain information at least 24
hours before the abortion is performed."57 Second, a minor seeking
an abortion had to obtain the informed consent of one of her parents
or guardians, but could use ajudicial bypass procedure if the minor
did not want to or could not obtain such consent.5" Third, the law
required a married woman to certify that she had notified her
husband of an intended abortion.59 Fourth, a "medical emergency",
as determined by a physician to require an immediate abortion to
avert the woman's death or a serious risk of impairment of a major
bodily function, eliminated these requirements." Finally, the law
required facilities providing abortion services to keep records that
did not disclose the identities of the women who had undergone
abortions, but did require reporting of a married woman's decision
not to provide notice to her husband. 1
Casey fractured the Court into several different opinions. A
majority of the justices agreed that the emergency provision, the
minor parental consent provision with ajudicial bypass, the 24 hour
waiting period, the informed consent provision, and the general
reporting requirements met constitutional standards. 2 Yet, the
majority also struck down the spousal notification requirement and
the reporting of failures of spousal notification.6 3  The Casey
53. Id. at 78-79.
54. Id. at 83.
55. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
56. Id. at 844 (explaining the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 3203-3220 (1990) (as amended in 1988 and 1989)).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 901.
63. Id.
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opinions upheld the continuing validity of the rights enunciated in
Roe and supported the protection of those rights from the
imposition of "undue burdens" by the states.64
Of particular interest was the Court's definition of such an
"undue burden". In Casey, the Court wrote that "a law designed to
further the State's interest in fetal life which imposes an undue
burden on the woman's decision before fetal viability" is
unconstitutional. 65 Further, an "undue burden is a shorthand for
the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion of a nonviable fetus."66 In other words, a regulation need
not have thepurpose of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of
a woman seeking to terminate her pre-viable pregnancy in order to
run afoul of her rights; it need only have that effect. As applied to
a given situation, a facially neutral regulation might unduly
interfere with an individual woman's access to an abortion.
.Casey also upheld the principle that the state's interest in fetal
life did not outweigh the mother's interest in her own health even
after viability.67 Although Casey did not involve regulations
pertaining to a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy for health
reasons, except in situations which involved relieving pregnant
women from waiting, informed consent, parental consent, and
spousal notification provisions in a medical emergency. The Court
later addressed the right to terminate a pregnancy in Stenberg v.
Carhart.6" In this case, the Court specifically ruled that a Nebraska
.statute prohibiting partial birth abortion when only the health, but
not the life, of the woman was at risk was unconstitutional.69 The
Court found that because partial birth abortion better protects the
woman's health in some circumstances because a complete ban
represented an undue burden on a woman's right to have an
abortion to protect her health.7 °
In sum, the decisions from Roe to Stenberg support a woman's
right to choose to have an abortion free from unreasonable burdens
imposed by the States. However, these cases only address State
attempts to limit legal access, not economic barriers such as lack of
government funding. The Court addressed these issues in a
64. Id. at 876.
65. Id.at 877.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 879.
68. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
69. Id. at 921-22.
70. Id. at 945-46.
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separate line of opinions that do not support the existence of an
affirmative government duty to fund abortion.
B. Funding Background Cases-Maher, Harris, Webster
and Rust
The federal courts draw a clear line between a woman's right
to have an abortion and the government's decision not to fund
abortion services. The line of cases Roe v. Wade71 to Stenberg v.
Carhart72 guarantee the right to abortion and freedom from
excessive state interference with that right, but a separate line of
cases supports government funding denials. These cases, described
below, generally hold that the government need not fund abortion
services, even when medically necessary.
Maher v. Roe73 was the first case to address the issue of state
funding for abortions after Roe v. Wade.74 In Maher, two indigent
Medicaid-eligible women sought funding for their abortions without
a physician's opinion, stating that the abortions were "medically
necessary", as was required by the Connecticut Welfare Department
regulation providing coverage.75 The District Court for the District
of Connecticut initially held that the Social Security Act (SSA)
required the funding of non-therapeutic abortions upon request
from a Medicaid-eligible recipient.76 On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the SSA did not
require such funding.77 On remand, the District Court convened a
three judge panel and held that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment forbade the exclusion of non-therapeutic
abortions from state funding when the funding program otherwise
provided coverage for pregnancy.7" The Court cited both Roe v.
Wade and Doe v. Bolton as establishing the equality of abortion and
childbirth as medical means of addressing pregnancy.79 The court
wrote,
71. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
72. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
73. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
74. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113. (1973).
75. Maher, 432 U.S. at 46.
76. Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726, 730-31 (D. Conn. 1974), reversed by Roe, infra note
77.
77. Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1975).
78. Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660, 665 (D. Conn. 1975), reversed by Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464 (1977).
79.
.359
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The state may not justify its refusal to pay for one type of
expense arising from pregnancy on the basis that it morally
opposes such an expenditure of money. To sanction such a
justification would be to permit discrimination against those
seeking to exercise a constitutional right on the basis that the
state simply does not approve of the exercise of that right."0
The Supreme Court, in Maher, overturned the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit."' The Court noted that the state had no
obligation to provide abortion services to the poor, but in choosing
to do so, must provide the service in a constitutional manner.8 2
Having framed the question in Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection terms, the court applied the following standard analysis:
does the State act to the detriment of a suspect classification or
infringe on a fundamental constitutional right? 3 If so, does the
State meet the compelling interest requirements of strict scrutiny? 4
If not, is the State acting rationally to protect some legitimate,
articulated state interest? 5
The Court quickly dismissed the suspect class argument,
holding that poverty was insufficient to define a suspect class. 6
Moving on to the issue of whether a fundamental constitutional
right was implicated by the Connecticut regulation, the Court found
that no such interest was affected. 7 Justice Powell, who authored
the majority opinion, contrasted the criminal abortion prohibition
in Roe v. Wade with the denial of funding for abortions under the
Connecticut regulation. 8 While a blanket prohibition on abortion
impermissibly interfered with a fundamental right, the mere
decision not to subsidize abortion only required a rational basis. 9
The Court found that the regulation was rationally related to
promoting a legitimate, articulated State interest, citing Roe v.
Wade itself as conceding a State interest in fetal protection.9" The
court declined to inquire too deeply into the State's reasoning that
"when an issue involves policy choices as sensitive as those
implicated by public funding of non-therapeutic abortions, the
80. Id. at 664.
81. Maher, 432 U.S. at 465.
82. Id. at 469-70.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 470 (citing San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973)).
86. Id. at 470-71.
87. Id. at 474.
88. Id. at 471-74.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 478.
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appropriate forum for their resolution in a democracy is the
legislature."91
In dissent, Justice Brennan wryly quoted Justice Frankfurter
and Anatole France:
To sanction such a ruthless consequence, inevitably resulting
from a money hurdle erected by the State, would justify a latter-
day Anatole France to add one more item to his ironic comments
on the 'majestic equality' of the law. 'The law, in its majestic
equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under
bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread'....
He went on to write that the Connecticut regulation clearly
infringes on the privacy rights of poor women "by bringing financial
pressure on indigent women that force them to bear children. 93
Maher set the first precedent in the development of this line of
cases. While limited on its facts to elective, non-therapeutic
abortions, the case clarified abortion's status as a right, but not a
right that the government must facilitate. The Court essentially
held that the government had no affirmative duty to subsidize
abortion rights for the poor.
In 1976, the Hyde Amendments began to severely limit the
types of abortions funded under Title XIX of the Social Security
Act.94 The "Hyde Amendment", named for its sponsor, United
States Representative Henry Hyde, is actually a series of
amendments to various bills. The first amendment was to the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, which restricted Medicaid
abortions.95 Over the next 25 years, Congress added additional
restrictions in other acts. These included amendments to the 1977
Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare,
91. Id. at 479.
92. Id. at 483 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 23 (1956)
(concurring opinion)).
93. Id. at 484.
94. Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-189, 87 Stat. 714 (1973). Other
legislation containing abortion restrictions includes (1) the Legal Services Corporation Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378 (1974) (restricting Legal Aid agencies receiving
federal funds from engaging in litigation to procure non-therapeutic abortions); (2) the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Pregnancy Discrimination, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978)
(permitting employers not to cover abortion services in healthcare plans); and Title IX of the
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 535, 592 (1981) (permitting the
allocation of federal funds only to health programs that do not advocate or provide abortions,
except in the case of a pregnant minor who had the permission of both her parents or
guardians).
95. Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-189 § 114, 87 Stat. 714.
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Appropriation Act,96 the 1984 Department of Defense Appropriation
Act,97 the 1979 District of Columbia Appropriation Act,98 and the
1984 Department of the Treasury and Postal Service
Appropriations Act.99 These Acts eliminated federal funding for
abortions in various programs except when the life of the mother
would be endangered if the child were carried to term. In 1987, a
Continuing Resolution (a legislative budgetary stopgap measure)
allowed federal abortion funding in cases of rape.' °
Several groups challenged the regulations as violating the First
and Fifth Amendments. They requested a ruling that the States
were required to fund abortions when medically necessary despite
the Hyde Amendment. The District Court for the Eastern District
of New York initially issued a preliminary injunction enjoining
enforcement of the Hyde Amendments. 1° 1 The Supreme Court
vacated the injunction and remanded the case for reconsideration 10 2
in light of Maher and Beal v. Doe, another case that held that
Medicaid rules did not require funding for abortion.'
Upon reconsideration, the district court again ruled that the
Amendments violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment and the Equal Protection component of the Fifth
Amendment by impinging on the privacy rights of indigent women
to terminate a pregnancy rather than suffer a health risk. °4 On the
Equal Protection component, the district court found no rational
basis for choosing not to fund medically necessary abortions while
choosing in general to fund necessary medical services. 0' Similarly,
the court found that the Free Exercise of Religion rights of Jewish
and Protestant women were violated, as the law reflected
traditional Catholic view of abortion and the beginning of life.'
The Court, however, did not find that states were compelled to fund
96. Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare, Appropriation Act, Pub.
L. No. 94-439, 90 Stat. 1418 (1977).
97. Department of Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 98-525, 98 Stat. 2492 (1985).
98. District of Columbia Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-530, 94 Stat. 3121, 3127-28
(1980).
99. Continuing Appropriations, Pub. L. No. 98-107, 97 Stat. 733 (1984).
100. Continuing Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-591, 100 Stat. 3341
(1987).
101. McRae v. Mathews, 421 F. Supp. 533 (E.D.N.Y 1976)judgment vacated by Califano
v. McRae, 433 U.S. 916 (1977).
102. Califano v. McRae, 433 U.S. 916 (1977).
103. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
104. McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 739-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)judgment reversed by
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
105. Id. at 739-40.
106. Id. at 741-42.
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medically necessary abortions in the absence of federal funding
under the Title XIX program, nor that the Amendments violated
the Establishment Clause.' °7
On appeal, in Harris v. McRae, the Supreme Court upheld the
statutory findings of the District Court on other grounds but
overturned its constitutional findings regarding Equal Protection.10 8
The Court ruled that the "cornerstone of Medicaid is financial
contribution by both the Federal Government and the participating
State.""0 9 Thus, the States were not obligated under Medicaid to
provide funding for procedures for which they would not receive
reimbursement from the federal government.10  Quoting
extensively from Maher, the Court found no impingement of a
fundamental constitutional right. The Court wrote, "although
government may not place obstacles in the path of a woman's
exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of its
own creation."' The Court held that the government had not
placed women in poverty and therefore had no duty to mitigate the
effects of poverty on the exercise of their reproductive rights."2
The First Amendment Establishment Clause also did not
invalidate the Hyde Amendments. The Court found that the
Amendments had "a secular legislative purpose, . . . neither
advances nor inhibits religion, and ... does not foster an excessive
government entanglement with religion", therefore meeting
Establishment Clause muster."3 Addressing the effect of the Hyde
Amendments on the Free Exercise Clause, the Court found that the
challengers/appellees lacked standing to address the issue."' The
appellees fell into three categories-indigent pregnant women suing
on behalf of others in a similar situation, two officers of the
Women's Division of the Board of Global Ministries of the United
Methodist Church, and the Women's Division itself."5 The first
category did not prove they had sought an abortion under a
religious compulsion, the second category had not proven that they
were pregnant or indigent, and the third category did not meet the
107. Id.
108. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
109. Id. at 308.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 316.
112. Id. at 316-17.
113. Id. at 319 (quoting Committee for Public Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 653 (1980)).
114. Id. at 370.
115. Id.
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requirements for standing because they could not prove that the
individual participation of any member was unimportant.116
Addressing the Equal Protection Clause argument, the Court
held that in addition to not involving any substantive constitutional
rights, the indigent women plaintiffs in the case were not members
of a protected classification.'17 The Court essentially repeated its'
finding in Maher that indigence, in itself, is simply not a suspect
class." ' Justice Brennan again penned the dissent, reiterating his
disagreements with the decision in Maher."9 Mocking the Court's
reasoning that the case involved no government action interfering
with a woman's right to choose, he wrote, "what the Court fails to
appreciate is that it is not simply the woman's indigency that
interferes with her freedom of choice, but the combination of her
own poverty and the Government's unequal subsidization of
abortion and childbirth.' 2 °
Harris extended the government's right to discriminate
between generally medically necessary services and medically
necessary abortion services. While Maher had dealt with a
woman's right to funding in the absence of a medical necessity,
Harris found a legitimate government interest in choosing which
medically necessary services to fund. 121 As the plaintiffs
challenged the amendments facially, rather than as applied, the
Court did not address the issue of whether a certain set of facts
would present such a compelling argument that the government
could not legitimately prevent funding. This left the door open for
the later findings in the Britell and Doe cases.'22
In 1986, the Governor of Missouri signed a bill into law that
severely limited state funding for abortion.'23 The bill's most
controversial sections included a statement that human life began
at conception,'24 an equality provision for unborn children, 2 ' a
requirement that physicians assess the gestational age of any fetus
over twenty weeks gestation,1 26 a prohibition on the use of public
employees and facilities to perform abortions, and a prohibition on
116. Id. at 320-21.
117. Id. at 323.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 329-30 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 333.
121. Id. at 324-26.
122. See infra, at V.
123. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1989).
124. Id. at 501 (citing Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 1.205.1(1)-(2) (1986)).
125. Id. (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205.2 (1986)).
126. Id. (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 188.029 (1986)).
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the use of public instrumentalities in abortion counseling except
when the life of the mother was at risk.'27 In Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, the Supreme Court quickly disposed
of the "life at conception" provision, finding that it was merely a
statement of belief, had no effect on the practice of abortion, and did
not implicate constitutional concerns. 1
28
Relying on Maher and Harris, the Court also upheld the
prohibition on the use of state employees, facilities, and funds for
abortions that did not involve the protection of the life of the
mother.'29 In doing so, the Court rejected the argument that the
prohibition unreasonably restricted access to abortion.13 ° In the
Court's view, the facilities prohibition did not raise any more
substantial issue than the decision not to fund abortion services.' 3 '
The state did not have to support abortion through funding or
facilities. 132
The Court similarly disposed of other objections to the statute.
To avoid interfering with the doctor-patient relationship, Missouri
alleged that the prohibition on funding for abortion counseling did
not apply to physicians, but rather only to the state financial
controllers who disbursed state funds. 33 Therefore, as the
physicians were not adversely affected, the Court found no case or
controversy before it and did not rule on the issue.33 The Court
also upheld the requirement for a physician to determine the
viability of a fetus at twenty weeks, finding that it simply reflected
the legitimate state concern with balancing the potential life of the
fetus after the point of viability. 135 Also, the state could legitimately
require determination of the viability of the fetus at twenty weeks,
because viability generally begins at twenty-four weeks and four
weeks error was standard in determining gestational age.
36
Post-Webster, Government restrictions on abortion continued
to grow. In 1970, Congress passed Title X of the Public Health
Services Act. 137 The Act generally provided federal funding for
family planning services. The Act authorized the Secretary of
127. Id. (citing Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 188.205, 188.210, 188.215. (1986)).
128. Webster, 492 U.S. at 507.
129. Id. at 508.
130. Id. at 509.
131. Id. at 509-10.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 512.
134. Id. at 511-12.
135. Id. at 512-20.
136. Id.
137. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300a-6 (1970).
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Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW, later renamed Health and
Human Services, or HHS) to grant funds or enter into contracts
with public or nonprofit private parties for the purpose of improving
voluntary family planning. 3 ' Section 1008 of the Act prohibited the
funding of programs where abortion is a method of family plann-
ing."' In 1988, the Secretary of HHS promulgated regulations
defining "family planning" exclusively as preventive services, and
prohibited a project from receiving these funds because it provided
counseling concerning the use of abortion as a method of family
planning and provided referrals for abortion services.14 ° The
regulations further required referral to a list of providers who
promote the welfare of mother and unborn child, and prohibited:
weighting that list towards abortion providers; putting abortion
clinics on the list; excluding health care providers who do not
provide abortion; and steering clients toward particular providers
who offer abortion services.' The regulations also provided that
Title X projects must be physically and financially separate from
any prohibited abortion-related activities.142
A group of Title X grantees and doctors who supervised Title X
funds quickly challenged the facial validity of the new regulations
on the grounds that they were not authorized by Title X and that
they violated the First and Fifth Amendment rights of Title X
clients and the First Amendment rights of Title X providers.143 The
district court rejected the petitioners' challenge and granted
summaryjudgment to the government.'44 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision, holding that
the regulations were a permissible construction of the statute and
legitimately interpreted congressional intent under the deference
required by Chevron U.S A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.14
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the
lower courts.146 Noting that the petitioners had attacked the facial
validity of the statute, the Court examined the regulations to see if,
on their face, they would be constitutional as applied to a set of
138. Id. at §§ 300a-4(a).
139. Id. at §§ 300a-6.
140. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(1) (2003).
141. Id. at § 59.8(a)(3).
142. Id. at § 59.9.
143. New York v. Bowen, 690 F. Supp. 1261, 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
144. Id. at 1274.
145. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-83 (1984); New
York v. Bowen, 889 F.2d 401 (1989).
146. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 178 (1991).
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individuals and if they were indeed authorized by the statute. 147
The Court quickly disposed of the question of whether the
regulations were arbitrary and capricious. The Court found the
regulations to be a valid interpretation of the statutory
authorization, noting the broadness of the Section 1008 language,
"[n]one of the funds appropriated under this subchapter shall be
used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning."148
The Court found that Chevron requires substantial judicial
deference to the agency interpreting the regulation when confronted
with ambiguous language. 149
The legislative history of the statute also included contradictory
statements of intent.150 The petitioners argued that the regulations
should not be accorded this deference because they reversed a long
policy that permitted abortion counseling and referral."'5 The Court
rejected this argument, as it had in Chevron, and found that "the
Secretary had amply justified his change of interpretation".1 52
Turning to the program integrity/separation portion of the
regulations, which required separation of facilities, personnel, and
records, the Court rejected the argument that these were contrary
to the congressional intent to have Title X programs as part of a
broader, comprehensive, health care system. 53 Crediting the
Secretary's argument that the separation was necessary to prevent
the appearance of a government subsidy of abortion, the Court
found sufficient justification for the separation in the congressional
prohibition on funding abortion-related activities. 154
The Court next addressed the First Amendment concerns of the
petitioners, who alleged that the regulations impermissibly imposed
"'viewpoint-discriminatory conditions on government subsidies' and
thus penaliz[e] speech funded with non-Title X monies" and
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.'55 Quoting Maher, the Court
found that Section 1008 and the regulations were clearly
constitutional.' The Court did not agree with the argument that
the regulations impermissibly predicated receipt of a government
benefit on the relinquishment of a constitutional right, i.e. freedom
147. Id. at 183-87.
148. Id. at 118 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1970)).
149. Id. at 186-87 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 187.
153. Id. at 186-87.
154. Id. at 190.
155. Id. at 192.
156. Id.
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of speech in counseling pregnant women. 157 The Court instead held
that the regulations were distinct from a predication on receipt of
benefits in exchange for the relinquishment of a right, in that they
solely represented a prohibition on spending government funds on
certain activities and not a restriction on behavior.
158
The Court also found that, as in McRae, the mere denial of
government funding for the exercise of a right did not constitute
government action impeding the exercise of that right.159 The
majority also rejected the contention that the regulations
impermissibly infringed on the doctor-patient relationship and
deprived the Title X client of information necessary to exercise her
Fifth Amendment right to "medical self-determination".16 The
Court distinguished its earlier decisions in Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health, Inc.,61 and Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists.62 by noting that those
cases had involved the state mandating the provision of certain
information to all patients regardless of their desire to have the
information. 63 In the instant case, the regulations did nothing to
inhibit the free communication between physicians and patients
outside the Title X setting.164
Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor dissented. 65
Justice Blackmun thought the Secretary had exceeded the statutory
authorization and that no decision on the constitutional grounds
was necessary.166 He expressed strong reservations about
viewpoint-based suppression of speech through the withholding of
public funds. 67 Justice Stevens wrote separately to express his
displeasure over the majority's neglect of the wording of the statute,
157. Id. at 192-99.
158. Id. at 197-99.
159. Id. at 201-02.
160. Id. at 202.
161. Id. at 202. The Court in Akron found, in relevant part, that requiring a woman's
physician to engage in a lengthy and rigid lecture regarding the dangers of abortion and
alternatives to abortion impermissibly interfered with the physician-patient relationship and
impermissibly required more informed consent procedure than was necessary. Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 444 (1983).
162. Rust, 500 U.S. at 202-03. The Court in Thornburgh found, in relevant part, that the
state could not require a physician to provide certain written materials to his patients
seeking abortions, as those materials served to impermissibly intimidate women into
continuing their pregnancy. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759 (1986).
163. Rust, 500 U.S. 202-03.
164. Id. at 203.
165. Id. at 207-211 (Blackmun, O'Conner, Stevens, J.J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 204-220 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
167. Id.
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arguing that the statute explicitly required disclosure of all legal
options during pregnancy.161 Justice O'Connor agreed with Justice
Blackmun's admonition that the Court must consider statutory
construction before constitutional grounds, and thought that the
Secretary had overstepped the statutory authority of Section
1008.169
Rust went beyond Maher and McRae in finding that the
government also could not only choose not to fund abortion services,
but could intervene in the doctor-patient relationship to prevent
discussion of abortion as an option. 7 ° The Rust case seriously
undermines the principles of informed consent, albeit in such a way
as to give the physician an affirmative defense for failing to disclose
the abortion option. Arguably, the only option available to a
physician in a Title X program when confronted with an already
pregnant patient who wished to terminate her pregnancy would be
to discuss birth control and family planning as it related to her next
child and to refer her to another provider who could at least discuss
abortion. The Rust plaintiffs, however, again challenged the
regulations facially, rather than as applied in a particular case. 7 '
This again left open the possibility that a certain set of facts would
so compel the Court that it would make an exception in that case or
for that particular class of plaintiffs.
In sum, the line of cases from Maher to Rust supports the facial
validity of government decisions to not fund abortion services. This
line of precedent is not without its critics, who cite the
disproportionate impact of funding policies on the poor, minorities,
and the very young. 72 Although even these critics generally
concede that a different approach to the issue must be taken to
secure favorable decisions.173 The plaintiffs, in choosing a facial
challenge, never presented the Court with the particular case of a
medically necessary abortion. Thus, while finding that a blanket
government decision not to fund medically necessary abortion was
permissible, the Court never considered whether the circumstances
of a particular case involving therapeutic abortion might be so
compelling as to require government funding. The Court never
found that the government required even a rational basis for the
168. Id. at 220- 22323 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 223-25 (O'Conner, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 177-78.
171. Id.
172. See e.g., Eileen L. McDonaugh, My Body, My Consent: Securing the Constitutional
Right to Abortion Funding, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1057 (1999).
173. Id. at 1061.
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regulations, as the challengers had only alleged that the class to be
protected was indigent, 174 a class not protected in earlier cases.
In choosing facial challenges in McRae and Rust, the plaintiffs
took on a heavy burden. Suing on behalf of a class has certain
grandeur and potential for broad social change, but neglects the
critical advantages of having a detailed and particularly
sympathetic set of facts to put before the court.175 A case-by-case
approach allows the court to take gradual steps with less chance of
reversal upon appeal. As demonstrated below, this approach can
succeed even in the face of unfavorable precedent, as it does not
require the court to make broad declarations regarding the wisdom
of legislative or regulatory policy, but rather to examine the
application of a broad policy to a narrow set of circumstances.
III. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND OF AIR FORCE
POLICY
Title 10 of the United States Code, Section 1093, prohibits
military funding for abortion services and prohibits the
performance of abortions in military facilities, except to protect the
life of the mother. 76 Air Force policy has struggled to reconcile
federal court decisions protecting abortion rights, the requirements
of informed consent, and the statutory prohibition on spending
federal funds for abortion services. In general, as described above,
Roe v. Wade and its Supreme Court progeny protect a woman's
right to terminate a pregnancy with very few restrictions in the
first trimester, with increasing potential for restrictions as the
pregnancy progresses.1 77 These decisions equally protect military
women and military family members. Additionally, military
physicians must obey state and professional mandates regarding
informed consent. 178 These mandates require complete disclosure
of all legal and medically appropriate options for pregnant women,
including abortion. Federal law, however, prohibits the expenditure
174. Rust, 500 U.S. at 201-02.
175. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 437 (1985). In
Cleburne, the plaintiffs claimed that an otherwise valid zoning ordinance was
unconstitutional as applied to a home for the mentally retarded, because the neutral nature
of the ordinance did not prevent it from invidiously discriminating against the mentally
retarded under the circumstances of the case. Id.
176. Pub. L. No. 98-525, Title XIV, § 1401(e)(5)(A), 98 Stat. 2492, 2618 (1985) amended by
Pub. L. No. 104-106, Div A, Title VII, Subtitle D, § 738(a), (b)(1), 110 Stat. 186, 383 (1996).
177. Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
178. The Federal Tort Claims Act (F.T.C.A.), 28 U.S.C. § 2674 et. seq. (2003) holds military
physicians to the same standards of care as civilian physicians for the purposes of tort
liability.
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of federal funds for abortions when the life of the mother is not at
risk.179 The performance of abortions in military facilities is also
forbidden, unless either the life of the mother is at risk or the
pregnancy is the result of rape or incest."' 0 While the Air Force has
managed to shape a facially neutral abortion policy, in practice the
policy obstructs access to abortion.
A. Informed Consent
Several medical organizations have developed professional
practice requirements mandating that, consistent with the
bioethical principles of patient autonomy and informed consent,
physicians must counsel women about all their options during
pregnancy.'81 General principles of informed consent, as codified in
state law or developed in state common law, also require physicians
to counsel pregnant women regarding all their legal and medically
appropriate options."8 2  The American Medical Association's
"Fundamental Elements of the Patient-Physician Relationship"
requires that the physician provide information regarding
appropriate alternatives and allow the patient to make treatment
decisions.'83 Similarly, the American College of Obstetrics and
Gynecology,8 4 the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American
Academy of Family Practitioners,"'% and the American College of
Emergency Physicians187 recommend disclosure of all legal and
179. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1970).
180. Pub. L. No. 98-525, 98 Stat. 2492, 2618 (1985), amended by Pub. L. No. 104-106, Div.
A, Title VII, Subtitle D, § 738(a), (b)(1), 110 Stat. 186, 383 (1996).
181. Am. Med. Ass'n Code of Med. Ethics, § E-8.08 Informed Consent, available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2503.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
182. See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 4590i, § 6.07 (2003).
183. Am. Med. Ass'n, Fundamental Elements of the Patient-Physician Relationship, §§ 1-2,
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2510.html (last visited Apr. 4,2003).
184. AM. COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS 2, available at
http://www.acog.org/from-home/acogcode.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2003). See, e.g., Am.
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, President's Gag Rule Increases Health Risks for
Women Abroad, Say US Ob-Gyns, Jan. 23, 2001, available at http://www.acog.org/from-
home/newsrel.cfm (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
185. AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, POLICY STATEMENT, COUNSELING THE ADOLESCENT ABOUT
PREGNANCY OPTIONS, at http://www.aap.org/policy/re9743.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
186. AM. ACAD. OF FAMILY PRACTITIONERS, REPRODUCTIVE DECISIONS, at http://www.aafp.
org/x7053.xml (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
187. AM. MED. ASS'N AM. COLLEGE OF EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/article/7665-4671.html (last visited Apr. 4,2003). "Patients with decision-
making capacity must give their voluntary consent to treatment after receiving appropriate
and relevant information about the nature of the affliction and expected consequences of
recommended treatment and treatment alternatives." Id. at II.B.2.
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medically appropriate options to pregnant women.' Legally, a
physician who fails to disclose all medically appropriate options for
treatment does not facilitate a complete informed consent, commits
malpractice, and may be held liable for damages, regardless of the
physician's personal morality or contractual obligations.
8 9
The law may modify these duties. For instance, as described
above, Title X family planning programs may not discuss abortion
as a means of family planning because Title X programs provide
exclusively preconception family planning services. 9 ' Arguably,
this does not relieve the provider of the affirmative duty to inform
the patient that the provider may not discuss issues of abortion and
to refer the patient to a provider who can. While the Title X
regulations prohibit participating programs from discussing
abortion with their clients, physicians operating under a Title X
program still must comply with the state and professional
requirements of complete informed consent.
Many Air Force physicians feel the prohibition on performance
of abortions and funding for them under the military system
absolves them of the duty to discuss the abortion option with their
patients.' 9' They also may misconstrue the Air Force policy of
exempting physicians from performing abortions if they morally
object to the procedure as permission to refuse to discuss abortion
entirely, which is not Air Force policy.' 9 ' By its own terms, the
"conscientious objection" clause is limited to the actual performance
of abortions, not mere patient counseling regarding permissible
options.' 9
In fact, the Air Force requires Medical Group Commanders to
promulgate guidance on informed consent procedures consistent
188. Other specialties have similar informed consent provisions. I chose these specialties
because they most often examine and treat pregnant women.
189. For a complete discussion of these issues, see Julia A. Martin & Lisa K. Bjerknes, The
Legal and Ethical Implications of Gag Clauses in Physician Contracts, 22 AM. J. L. AND MED.
433 (1996). See also Mary Ann Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of
"Rights": A Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 453, 484-87 (1991); Sylvia A. Law,
Silent No More: Physicians' Legal and Ethical Obligations to Patients Seeking Abortions, 21
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 279 (1994-95).
190. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
191. Interviews with Air Force physicians, Wilford Hall Med. Center (Oct. 2002). Wilford
Hall is located at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas.
192. AFI 44-102, § 2.10.3, Community Health Management (Nov. 17, 1999), at
http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/44/afi44-102/afi44-102.pdf. "Medical personnel who
have a personal or moral objection to abortion need not assist in the procedure unless their
refusal poses life-threatening risks to the patient. NOTE: This applies only to providers
directly involved in performing the abortion procedure itself." Id.
193. Id.
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with state law and local practice.'94 As the states require disclosure
of all medically appropriate alternatives through common law or
statute, this implies that physicians must counsel pregnant women
regarding abortion. '95 The °Air Force also requires medical
treatment facilities to create procedures for abortion referrals.
Unfortunately, this policy is most likely observed in the breach.196
Air Force physicians generally do not clearly understand the
current policy of complete informed consent and referral, but no
performance or funding, dnd object to certain provisions. The
physicians interviewed for this paper strongly supported a
physician's right to decline to discuss abortion with a patient on
moral grounds.1 97 To their credit, all physicians interviewed said
that they would refer a woman to a provider willing to discuss
elective termination of pregnancy if the woman inquired about it.198
The physicians primarily objected to the limitation on abortion in
military facilities in two respects. First, it limits a woman's access
to therapeutic termination of pregnancy. All physicians
interviewed felt that the military should allow therapeutic
abortions in military treatment facilities. 99 Second, the physicians
believed they were prohibited from referring a woman to any
particular abortion provider. Some felt that the quality of abortion
providers varied greatly, and that this referral limitation prevented
their patients from getting the best quality care.2"0 All physicians
felt that the frequent changes in policy had made it difficult for
physicians to keep track of the current Air Force requirements
regarding the policy on the termination of pregnancy.2"'
B. Federal Limitations on Abortion Funding
The Air Force and TRICARE must adhere to 10 U.S.C. § 1093,
the statutory prohibition on the use of federal funds to provide
abortions except when the life of the mother is endangered. The
statute, passed in 1984, initially read: "[flunds available to the
194. Id. at § 2.37-2.39.
195. Id. at § 2.37-2.39, § 20.
196. Interviews at Wilford Hall Medical Center established that, while such procedures
had existed in the past, physicians were generally unable to name a single MTF that
currently had such procedures in place. Interviews with Air Force physicians, Wilford Hall
Med. Center (Oct. 2002).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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Department of Defense may not be used to perform abortions except
where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were
carried to term."" 2 It is important to note that the prohibition on
funding does not include a "gag order" prohibiting the discussion of
abortion with patients. The Air Force, along with the other military
services (and perhaps not unreasonably in light of the statutory
language), proceeded to ban all abortions at military facilities. °3
Upon taking office, President William J. Clinton immediately
reversed this decision, ordering the Secretary of Defense to permit
privately funded abortions at military facilities.20 4 He wrote:
Section 1093 of title 10 of the United States Code prohibits the
use of Department of Defense ('DOD') funds to perform
abortions except where the life of a woman would be endangered
if the fetus were carried to term. By memoranda of December
21, 1987, and June 21, 1988, DOD has gone beyond what I am
informed are the requirements of the statute and has banned all
abortions at United States military facilities, even where the
procedure is privately funded. This ban is unwarranted.
Accordingly, I hereby direct that you reverse the ban
immediately and permit abortion services to be provided, if paid
for entirely with non-DOD funds and in accordance with other
relevant DOD policies and procedures. °5
The Air Force now had to walk a narrow path-it had to allow both
counseling and performance of abortions in military facilities when
privately funded, but also had to prohibit the use of federal funds
in performing them. In an attempt to implement President
Clinton's policy change, the military surveyed all 44 military
physicians stationed in Europe.2"6 All of them ultimately refused to
perform abortions.2°  This resistance to the performance of
abortions at military facilities reflected both the more conservative
bent of most military members and physicians, and the intense
workload to which the military obstetricians were subjected to at
the time.208 According to one physician stationed in Europe at the
202. 10 U.S.C.S. § 1093(a) (1984) (amended by 10 U.S.C.S. § 1093(b) (1996); Pub. L. No.
98-525, Title XIV, § 1401(e)(5)(A) (1984)).
203. AFR 160-12, § 15, Medical Service Professional Policies and Procedures (June 13,
1985).
204. Exec. Order 58 Fed. Reg. 6439 (1993).
205. Id.
206. David C. Morrison, An Order That Didn't Take, 26 NAT'L J. 900, 900 (Apr. 16, 1994).
207. Id.
208. Id. See also Steven J. Nider, Cultural Divide: The Military Challenge, Blueprint
(July/Aug. 2001) at http://www.ndol.org/blueprintl2001jul-aug/militarychallenger.html (last
visited Apr. 4, 2003) (discussing a poll conducted by the Triangle Institute Security Studies
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time, "We were working 80-100 hours a week at my base and there
was no ability to add another service .... We were understaffed
and offered no additional support."2 °9 The physician also noted that
studies had shown that ninety percent of obstetricians felt distaste
at performing abortions and only performed them upon the
insistence of their patients.21 °  Not all physicians resisted
performing abortions, however. One obstetrician recalled that a
family practice physician threatened to start doing abortions
himself, despite lacking expertise in the area, while another felt
that the obstetricians should have been ordered to perform
abortions. 21  The military eventually began exploring using host
nation physicians in military facilities where available.2 2 This did
not resolve concerns about the illegality of abortion in many areas
and the qualifications of the local physicians who would be
performing them.
When the Republicans took over Congress in 1994, they passed
an additional section (b) to prohibit the practice of performing "at
cost" abortions in medical facilities.213 Section 1093(b) now reads,
No medical treatment facility or other facility of the Department
of Defense may be used to perform an abortion except where the
life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried
to term or. in a case in which the pregnancy is the result of an
act of rape or incest.2
14
The Air Force then promulgated several Air Force Instructions
interpreting the new statutory prohibition. The current version of
AFI 44-102, Community Health Management, provides:
Federal Law prohibits the use of DoD funds to pay for abortions
in the Continental United States (CONUS). EXCEPTION: When
a pregnancy would endanger a woman's life, Air Force medical
personnel may induce abortion. The patient's physician and
which showed that sixty-four percent of military members self-identified as Republicans
while only eight percent considered themselves Democrats). For more information regarding
the military physician-patient relationship with regard to reproductive and family matters,
see Patrick G. Spencer, Military Physician and Nurses' Knowledge and Use of Modern
Natural Family Planning, 37 MASTERSABSTR. 231 (1999), available at http://www.usuhs.mil/
gsn/nr/1996theses/spencer.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
209. E-mail communication (Oct. 18, 2002). Physician's name withheld by request.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Morrison, supra note 206, at 905.
213. 10 U.S.C.S. § 1093(b) (1996).
214. Id.
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MDG/CC must certify in the medical record that the abortion is
medically necessary.215
The Instructions further prohibit the performance of abortions
overseas, except when the pregnancy is the result of rape or
incest.216 In the case of rape or incest, the patient must still pay the
rate established in the Federal Register. 17  Physicians with a
conscientious objection to performing abortions do not have to do
the procedure, except when the life of the mother is jeopardized by
their refusal.21 This exception, however, applies only to the
personnel actually performing the abortion. 9 There is no provision
excusing a physician from advising a patient about her right to an
abortion for conscientious reasons.
220
If an abortion is permitted, such as in cases of rape or incest,
but not necessary to preserve the life of the mother, then the
patient must pay for the procedure at the current rate quoted in the
Federal Register.221 Minors may obtain abortions only with
parental consent,222 emancipation,228 or the determination that the
minor is "mature" by the Medical Group Commander. 224 Despite
the rather conservative bent of the regulations, they do require the
Medical Group Commander to develop means to ensure access to
abortion when the medical group itself does not provide abortion
services. 2 5 The rather vague wording of the AFI leaves open the
question of whether the referral procedures apply only when the
facility cannot provide abortions at all, or whether the facility must
provide referrals for even elective abortions that do not result from
rape or incest. As of November 2002, no medical group in the Air
215. AFI 44-102, § 2.01.1, Community Health Management (Nov. 17, 1999), at
http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/afi44-102/afi44-102.pdf.
216. Id. at § 2.10.2
217. Id. at §§ 2.10.2, 2.10.4.
218. Id. at § 2.10.3.
219. Id.
220. Indeed, as noted above, the AFI specifically requires adherence to state and local
informed consent procedures which require full disclosure of the abortion option. Id. at §
2.10.8.
221. Id. at § 2.10.4.
222. Id. at § 2.10.6.2.
223. Id.
224. Id. at § 2.10.6.1. The Instruction gives no definition of a mature minor. Generally,
Medical Group Commanders seek legal advice from the Staff Judge Advocate of the base host
unit or the Medical Law Consultant for the Region. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2674 et seq. (2003), state law applies in the United States. Under the Military
Claims Act, "general principles of American law" apply at overseas bases. See 10 U.S.C. §
2733.
225. AFI 44-102 at § 2.10.7.
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Force has published written guidelines for abortion referrals.226
The Air Force Consultant for Obstetrics, Dr. (Lt. Col.) Christopher
Zahn, confessed that he was unaware of any regulatory
requirement for referral procedures before our interview and
thought that the medical groups generally did not have such
processes in place.227  The AFI also requires that the Medical
Treatment Facility (MTF), a term encompassing all Air Force
medical offices, respect host nation laws regarding abortion, even
if such laws contradict the other policies stated in the
Instructions.228
The AFI next addresses issues of pregnancy in remote
locations. In general, the Air Force will curtail a woman's
assignment to a remote location at the twenty-fourth week of
pregnancy, or immediately if the MTF cannot support prenatal care
or if the pregnancy is complicated.229 In practice, this policy has
significant effects in deployed locations. Similarly, a member may
request reassignment to carry the pregnancy to term, but the
commander need not transfer her until the twenty-fourth week.23
A member may request leave to receive an abortion, but the
commander need not grant such a request, as discussed below.
Air Force Instruction 41-115, Health Services, clarifies and
reinforces the policies set forth in AFI 44-102:
Air Force medical personnel in overseas MTFs may perform
prepaid abortions only in cases where the patient is a victim of
rape or incest, or if the mother's life is endangered if she carries
the fetus to term. Abortions are available only when medical
teams have no objections to performing this service. In CONUS,
the Air Force restricts abortions to cases in which the mother's
life would be endangered if she carried the fetus to term.23'
In essence, Air Force MTF's perform abortions only in very
restricted circumstances. 2
226. Per my review of AFPUBS, Sept. 22, 2002, at http://www.e-publishing.af.mil.
227. Telephone interview with Dr. (Lt. Col.) Christopher Zahn, Air Force Consultant for
Obstetrics (Nov. 8, 2002). The Consultancy is an additional duty assigned to one or more of
the more senior obstetricians/gynecologists in the Air Force. The Consultant generally
advises the Air Force Surgeon General on policy issues in his or her field.
228. AFI 44-102, at § 2.10.8.
229. Id. at §§ 2.17.1-2.17.2. The Instruction does not define "complicated".
230. AFI 44-102, at § 2.17.1.
231. AFI 41-115, § 1.10, Health Services (Dec. 28, 2001), at http://www.e-
publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/41/afi4l-115/afi4l-115.pdf.
232. AFI 31-205, §§ 5.4.2-5.4.3, The Air Force Corrections System (Apr. 9, 2001), at
http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/31/afi31-205/afi31-205.pdf(providing for abortion
referrals for prisoners and prohibiting advocacy for or against abortion in the confinement
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Civilians accompanying military members receive health care
at military or civilian facilities through the Civilian Health and
Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS, now
known as TRICARE). TRICARE issued its own guidelines for
payment for abortion services. The regulation states:
The statute under which CHAMPUS [TRICARE] operates
prohibits payment for abortions with one single exception --
where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus
were carried to term. Covered abortion services are limited to
medical services and supplies only. Physician certification is
required attesting that the abortion was performed because the
mother's life would be endangered if the fetus were carried to
term. Abortions performed for suspected or confirmed fetal
abnormality (e.g., anencephalic) or for mental health reasons
(e.g., threatened suicide) do not fall within the exceptions
permitted within the language of the statute and are not
authorized for payment under CHAMPUS.
NOTE: Covered abortion services are limited to medical services
or supplies only for the single circumstance outlined above and
do not include abortion counseling or referral fees. Payment is
not allowed for any services involving preparation for, or normal
follow up to, a noncovered abortion. The Director, OCHAMPUS,
or a designee, shall issue guidelines describing the policy on
abortion.233
This prohibition has been recently eroded in the case of
anencephalic fetuses, as will be discussed below. In general,
however, the restriction on payments for abortion has been upheld
in the Supreme Court on several occasions.2 3" As explained earlier,
in the series of cases from Maher to Rust, the Court consistently
has drawn a distinction between the right to have an abortion and
the government's ability to deny funding for such services.2 35
Air Force practice in reproductive health tends to vary with the
subject matter. Abortion procedures continue to be tightly
restricted and abortion counseling may or may not be provided,
depending on the personal views of the military physician. Despite
the lack of coverage under TRICARE and similar moral objections,
facility). Arguably, prisoners have better access to abortion than non-incarcerated AF
members.
233. 32 C.F.R. § 199(e)(2) (2002).
234. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,201-03 (1991); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,
315 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1977).
235. Id.
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the military does provide in-vitro fertilization services at several
facilities. The above-quoted TRICARE/CHAMPUS coverage
regulation goes on to describe covered and uncovered family
planning services.236 In-vitro fertilization and other non-coital
reproductive technologies are not a covered procedure under
CHAMPUS.237 However, IVF and similar such procedures are often
performed at a much-reduced fee-for-service basis at the following
bases: Balboa Naval Medical Center, San Diego, California; Walter
Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, D.C.; Wilford Hall Medical
Center, San Antonio, Texas; and Tripler Army Medical Center,
Honolulu, Hawaii."' This dichotomy of policy is puzzling,
considering the similarity of moral issues involved.239
In a recent interview, Dr. (Lt. Col.) Christopher Zahn, the Air
Force Consultant for Obstetrics, discussed obstetrical practice and
physician attitudes regarding abortion services in the Air Force.240
Dr. Zahn agreed that women in the Air Force face significantly
higher access barriers than their civilian counterparts, primarily
because of the funding and practice restrictions imposed by
Congress.24' He noted that provider attitudes and training also
play a role.242 Air Force-trained obstetricians do not receive
training in termination of pregnancy, as none of the programs have
residency rotations in this field.243 Those that receive such training
in civilian residencies often have their skills atrophy over time from
lack of practice in the military.244 In Dr. Zahn's experience, most
Air Force OB-GYNs will discuss abortion with a patient, but not all
will. 245 He hoped that those who would not would refer the patient
to another physician, but could not guarantee that this always
236. 32 C.F.R. § 199(e)(3) (2002).
237. Id. at § 199.4(e)(3)(1)(B)(3).
238. Maj. Una Cuffy, A Child of Their Own, AIR FORCE NEWS SERV., at http://www.af.
mil/news/airman/0502/infer.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2003). While patients in the military
IVF programs do have to pay for the services they receive, they do not have to pay for any
of the personnel costs, as the medical staff are paid by the Air Force. This results in a very
substantial subsidy for the patient.1 239. Abortion and IVF address similar moral issues in that IVF frequently results in the
disposal of fertilized ova. For those who believe that life begins at conception, this is the
moral equivalent of abortion.
240. Zahn interview, supra note 227.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. Dr. Zahn may have been mistaken in this respect. Providers at Wilford Hall
Medical Center indicated that residents there could train at a civilian facility as an elective
rotation. Of course, many civilian residency programs do not include training on abortion,
either.
244. Id.
245. Id.
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happens.246 Dr. Zahn recounted difficulties in ensuring that
providers who oppose birth control refer patients to other
physicians for these services, and stated with some confidence that
all providers now knew their obligation to refer for these services.247
He also agreed with the common perception that a military
physician could not refer directly to any particular abortion
provider in the civilian community.
248
Dr. Zahn did not feel that increasing Air Force women's access
to civilian obstetrical care would necessarily increase their access
to abortion services.249 Currently, an Air Force woman may elect to
have an OB-GYN as her primary care physician (although access
may be limited at smaller facilities) and should not have to get a
non-availability slip to receive gynecological care from a civilian
provider.250 However, TRICARE reimbursement rates are often
comparatively low, limiting the number of physicians willing to take
new TRICARE patients. In December 2003, all military women will
be able to elect to have their obstetrical care provided in a civilian
facility for a nominal cost.251 Dr. Zahn felt that this would not
necessarily increase access to abortion services, as it would only
increase access for women who sought postnatal OBGYN care in
the community from OBGYNs who also performed abortions.252
However, in theory, seeking women's health care services in the
civilian sector could lead to receive referrals or fee-for-service
abortion services, increasing access to abortion services.253
In sum, Air Force policy regarding termination of pregnancy
has evolved, tracking changes in the law. Currently, Air Force
facilities may not provide abortion services except to preserve the
life of the mother in the United States and to preserve the life of the
mother or in cases of rape or incest overseas.254 While the
Instructions governing abortion services technically provide for
referral services for abortions, they do not protect access to abortion
in practice.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. A non-availability slip is a statement from the military that the requested medical
service cannot be provided within the military system. This allows the patient to receive
care from a civilian provider through TRICARE.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See 32 C.F.R. § 199(e)(2) (2002).
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IV. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL AVAILABILITY OF ABORTION
SERVICES
In addition to the difficulties in obtaining referrals for and
coverage of abortion services, women affiliated with the Air Force
face practical barriers in obtaining abortion services including
hostile local laws and the absence of abortion providers. In the
United States, the latter predominate, as Air Force bases are often
located at a significant distance from facilities performing
abortions. In general, the closer a base is to a major metropolitan
area, the more available abortion services will be. Overseas, the
climate for abortion seekers ranges from more permissive than the
United States in most (but not all) Western European countries, to
absolute hostility in most Middle Eastern countries. For a variety
of reasons, the countries outside the Middle East that host the
largest contingents of United States servicemembers tend to have
the most permissive abortion laws. Even in these areas, however,
language and cultural barriers still present significant obstacles to
obtaining abortion services.
A. In the United States - Geographical Availability as an
Access Restriction.
In the United States, several factors drove the Air Force to
build many bases at distances from the cities. Unlike the Army and
Navy with their long histories, the Air Force became a separate
service only in 1947.255 While Army Air Fields, the predecessors to
most modern Air Force bases, had existed prior to that time, they
did not spread across the country in large numbers until the Second
World War.256 Even then, they served primarily as training
facilities to generate trained personnel for overseas service.25 ' The
present-day distribution of Air Force bases in the United States
arose during the Cold War, and reflected the needs of that
conflict.25 The primary operational considerations of the time were
security and proximity to the Soviet Union. Given the limited
255. The Air Force was established by the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. 402
(2003). A brief history of the development of the Air Force is available at http://www.
airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/PopTopicsfEvolution.htm. For a more rigorous history, see WALTER
J. BOYNE, BEYOND THE WILD BLUE (1997).
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. For background history on the development of the Air Force, and especially Strategic
Air Command, see http://www.wpafb.af.mil/museum/history/postwwii/sac.htm (last visited
Apr. 4, 2003).
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range of aircraft and missiles of the day, and the relatively low
population density across the northern Midwest and West, a large
number of smaller bases sprung up along the Canadian border and
in Alaska.259 Training and test facilities remain largely in the
South, however. While base closings have eliminated some of the
more marginal facilities, many Air Force facilities are located in low
population density states where abortion services are limited.26 °
This is not to suggest that all Air Force women lack access to
abortion, nor any malfeasance on the part of the Air Force, but
rather to point out that a significant proportion of such women face
at least some practical barriers to access.
This distribution towards areas of low population density
becomes apparent by comparing the Air Force population to the
state population rank by civilian population density. Examining
the top 20 states by USAF enlisted census and population density,
it becomes apparent that significant portions of the Air Force live
in low-density areas where access might become an issue.261
259. Id.
260. Eighty-four percent of all United States counties have no identifiable abortion
providers. NATIONAL ABORTION FEDERATION, ACCESS TO ABORTION FACT SHEET, at
http://www.prochoice.orgfFacts/Factsheets/FS5.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2003). Outside of
metropolitan areas, the figure is ninety-seven percent. Id. For further demographic
information, see http://www.afpc.randolph.af.mil/demographics (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
261. Air Force active duty enlisted population from the Air Force Personnel Center
Demographics Website, is available at http://www.afpc.randolph.af.mil/demographics (last
visited Apr. 4, 2003). Population density information from 2000 Census, is available through
the State ofUtah website, http://www.governor.state.ut.us/dea/rankings/states/statedensity.
pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2003). Abortion provider information from the Nat'l Abortion Rights
Action League, is available at http://www.naral.org/mediaresources/publications.html (last
visited Apr. 4, 2003).
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STATE USAF U.S. Percent of Increase/ Number of
Population Population Counties Decrease in Providers
Density Lacking an Number of 1996
Ranking Abortion Abortion
Provider Providers
1992-1996
Texas 46,066 29 93% -19% 64
Florida 25,100 9 73% -149 114
California 19,955 13 36% -11% 492
Arizona 11,572 37 80% -14% 24
Virginia 14,116 15 79% -119 57
New Mexico 10,727 46 88% -35% 13
Georgia 10,092 19 90% -25% 41
Colorado 9,968 38 79% -20% 47
North 9,648 18 74% -31% 59
Carolina
South 9,271 22 80% -22% 14
arolina
aska 9,190 51 76% -38% 8
Oklahoma 8,870 36 95% N/A 11
ississippi 7,942 33 96% 25% 6
Iaryland 7,910 6 54% -8% 47
North 7,433 48 98% 0% 1
Dakota
Nevada 7,311 44 829 -18% 14
Washington 7,270 26 699 -12% 57
Nebraska 7,172 43 97% -11% 8
Louisiana 5,925 23 929 -12% 15
Illinois 5,707 12 909 -19% 38
Florida and Maryland present obvious exceptions to the density
issue, but the data show a disproportionate number of troops in low
population density states. Population density itself only suggests
an access problem, but the low and declining number of abortion
providers in these states provides further proof of potential
difficulties in accessing abortion services.
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B. Overseas-Local Legal Restrictions
Overseas, access becomes both a legal and a practical problem.
The Air Force's adherence to local anti-abortion laws, distance from
abortion facilities, and the unique nature of military leave present
significant access issues. While considerations of international law
do not mandate adherence to local law in all situations, the Air
Force has decided to forgo any treaty considerations and instead
conforms to local law.262 In 1999, the United Nations Population
Division compiled a comprehensive database of abortion policies
around the world.263 Using this information, a survey of the major
regions and countries in which Air Force members serve,
demonstrates a wide variety of local law and abortion availability.
The Air Force Personnel Center publishes monthly data of
permanent party members 264 stationed overseas, but does not track
personnel on temporary duty, activated Reservists, and military
dependents.2 65 As of February 2003, the total active duty strength
of the Air Force was 363,137, 19.05 percent of which were women.266
Approximately, 21.01 percent of the force is stationed overseas,267
including in Alaska and Hawaii.26 Data from February 2003 shows
1,939 female officers stationed overseas26 9 and 12,733 enlisted
women stationed overseas. 27° However, this includes only active
duty forces, not military family members.271
262. AFI 44-102, § 2.10.8, Community Health Management (Nov. 17, 1999), at
http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/44/afi44-102/afi44-102.pdf.
263. United Nations, Population Division, Abortion Policies: A Global Review, at
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/abortion/profiles.htm (last visited Apr. 4,
2003).
264. Permanent party members are those assigned to a location for 180 or more days.
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, at http://www.tricare.
asd.mil/administration/dodmilitary.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
265. Air Force Personnel Center Website, at http://www.afpc.randolph.af.
mil/vbin/broker8.exe (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
266. Id. Air Force Personnel Center Website, at http://www.afpc.randolph.af.miv
demographics (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
267. The Air Force considers all assignments outside of the continental United States to
be "overseas". Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, at
http://www.tricare.asd.mil/administration/dodmilitary.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
268. Air Force Personnel Center Website, supra notes 265-66.
269. Id. at http://www.afpc.randolph.af.mildemographics/demograf/TOUR.html (last
visited Apr. 4, 2003).
270. Id. athttp://www.afpc.randolph.af.mil/demographics.demograf.ENLTOUR.html (last
visited Apr. 4, 2003).
271. Id. at http://www.afpc.randolph.af.mil/demographics/HistMenu.htm (last visited Apr.
4, 2003).
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Air Force Permanent Party Overseas Population:
Countries With at Least Ten USAF Members
272
OUNTRY CENSUS
ERMANY 13,956
APAN 13,094
OUTH KOREA 8,625
UNITED KINGDOM - UK 8,507
UNKNOWN/DATA MASKED 7,481
ITALY 3,989
TURKEY 1,444
ORTUGAL 916
CELAND 562
ELGIUM 431
PAIN 250
ETHERLANDS 221
AUDI ARABIA 200
ONDURAS 176
REENLAND 96
INGAPORE 79
ANADA 73
REECE 67
USTRALIA 66
EGYPT 53
NORWAY 50
KUWAIT 30
DIEGO GARCIA-BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN 25
tERRITORY
THAILAND 25
BAHRAIN 20
FRANCE 20
MAN 17
ATAR 14
SRAEL 12
USSIA 11
ENMARK 10
272. Data from the Air Force Personnel Center Website, at http://www.afpc.randolph.af.
mil/demographics (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
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In addition to active duty members, significant numbers of
military family members reside overseas. Data released by the Air
Force Personnel Center for September 2000 shows significant (more
than 25) family member populations in Australia (109), Belgium
(668), Canada (121), Egypt (33), France (37), Germany (17,486),
Iceland (686), Israel (26), Italy (3,995), Japan (17,722), South Korea
(1,101), the Netherlands (355), Norway (71), Portugal (778),
Singapore (58), Spain (317), Thailand (48), Turkey (1,324), and the
United Kingdom (12,126).273 This includes a number of male family
members, as Air Force Personnel Center tracks all dependents.
The Air Force does not release troop strengths by location for
temporary duty airmen, as such information would provide an
operational benefit to the enemy.274 However, the Air Force has
more or less permanent presence, temporary duty locations in
Saudi Arabia (2), Kuwait, Turkey, and Oman, which do not
generally accommodate dependents. 5  In addition, more than
35,000 Air National Guardsmen and Air Reservists currently serve
on active duty in a variety of locations throughout the world. 276 The
local laws regarding abortion vary greatly among these locations.
Western Europe's abortion policies most closely parallel those
in the United States. In the United Kingdom (except for Northern
Ireland and a few other areas), two physicians must agree that the
pregnancy has not passed twenty-four weeks gestation, that the
termination is necessary to prevent injury to the physical or mental
health of the mother, that the continuation of the pregnancy would
risk the life of the mother, or that there is a substantial risk that
the child would be seriously handicapped.277 In practice, abortion
is available on demand, as these provisions are interpreted
liberally. While abortion is more difficult in Northern Ireland and
several small island jurisdictions, it is available in some restricted
circumstances, usually involving risks to the life of the mother.
Britain approved the use of mifepristone, a medical abortifacient,278
in 1991, becoming the second country in the world to do so.2 79
273. Air Force Personnel Center Website, at http://www.afpc.randolph.af.mil/
demographics/demograf/DPSARTFY00_DEPEND_3.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
274. Temporary duty airmen are those assigned to a location for 179 days or fewer.
275. Air Force Personnel Center. Website, at http://www.afpc.randolph.af.mil/
demographics/demograf/DPSARTFY00_DEPEND_3.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
276. Information as of March 2003, at http://www.defenselink.mil (last visited Apr. 4,
2003). Air National Guard and Air Reserve troops are usually part-time airmen called to
active duty in support of intensified operations.
277. United Nations, supra note 263.
278. An abortifacient is "a drug or other agent that induces abortion." WEBSTER'S
THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 5 (Philip Babcock Gove, Ph.D., ed. 1986).
279. Id.
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Mifepristone, or RU-486, was originally developed in France as a
medical alternative to surgical abortion during early pregnancy.20
It is now available in the United States, although not in the
military.281' From a practical standpoint, abortion is widely
available and covered by the British National Health Service.
In Germany, abortion is generally available without significant
restriction in the first twelve weeks of pregnancy after
informational, but not persuasive, counseling and a three-day
waiting period. 282 Abortion is actually outlawed in Germany, but
the woman or physician will not be punished if the guidelines are
followed. 283  However, because of the time restriction and
administrative difficulties, many women choose to go to the
Netherlands, where abortion is virtually unrestricted. 284 German
law permits abortions after twelve weeks when the life of the
mother is at risk.285 Because of the technical illegality of the
procedure, insurance does not cover abortion.2 6
Italian law permits abortions during the first twelve weeks
after a one-week reflection period, which can be waived in urgent
situations. 287 After twelve weeks, fetal genetic deficiency or a risk
to the physical or mental health of the mother will justify an
abortion, but it is no longer available on request.28 Abortions must
be performed for free at a public hospital or designated private
institutions. As a practical matter, abortion services are difficult to
obtain because of the unavailability of facilities and physicians who
are willing to perform them, in part because the Catholic Church
threatens excommunication for having or performing an abortion.289
While these three countries host the majority of Air Force
troops in Europe, there are small populations in other European
countries.290 The local laws range from very permissive (Albania,
Belgium, France, Greece, Hungary, Norway, the Netherlands,
Russia) to restrictive (Iceland, Spain) to absolutely prohibitive (the
280. 1 Am Jur. 2d Abortion and Birth Control § 2 (2002).
281. Doctors Use Pills in 6 Percent ofAbortions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2003, at A20; Tricare
Handbook, What's Not Covered, available at http://www.tricare.asd.mil/tricarehandbook/
results.cfm?fn=l&cn=11 (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
282. United Nations, supra note 263.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Air Force Personnel Center Website, at http://www.afpc.randolph.af.mil/
demographics (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
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Republic of Ireland, Malta). 291 Because of Europe's relatively
compact size, lack of border controls within much of the European
Union, and high proportion of permissive jurisdictions, women with
sufficient leave time and money generally can obtain abortions
within the first twelve weeks without difficulty.292 Second trimester
abortions present more difficult access issues, but are also available
in select jurisdictions.293
Far Eastern policies tend to reflect several influences
depending on the country: the preference for male children; an
adopted legal philosophy respecting personal autonomy; or the
influence of the Catholic Church.2 94 Australian law parallels
British law rather closely, permitting abortion on demand within
the first twelve weeks, although some territories require two
physicians to consult and the abortion to be performed in a
hospital.295
The Philippines forbids abortion except to preserve the life of
the mother. 96 Despite the prohibition and lengthy prison terms
associated with it, abortion is apparently widely available. The
Government, however, has become concerned with the connection
between abortion, poverty and the lack of birth control.297 The
Catholic Church, a major player in national politics, has
consistently reinforced the legal prohibition, but the Government
has not yet been moved to action.29 s
In Japan, abortion is not available on demand, but is available
in the first twenty-two weeks when the physical health or economic
standing of the mother may be seriously affected or the pregnancy
is the result of a crime."' The economic damage provision, almost
unique in the world, allows a woman to obtain an abortion when
having another child would negatively impact her economic
status. °0 In effect, this provision has allowed abortion whenever a
woman can convince a physician to perform the procedure. Japan
has a very high historical rate of abortion, thought to be the result
of forbidding the prescription of the birth control pill (except for
291. United Nations, supra note 263.
292. Id. (reviewing individual country information).
293. Id.
294. Id. (analyzing United Nations data).
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
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non-contraceptive purposes) until 1999.301 Despite legal
restrictions, access to abortion remains relatively easy in Japan." 2
Korea has perhaps the most permissive laws regarding
abortion, which developed in response to concerns about population
growth and the cultural preference for male children.0 3 Abortions
are available on demand in Korea during the first twenty-eight
weeks of pregnancy. Women have easy access to abortion, as
physicians perform most abortions in their own clinics.
China, Vietnam, and Cambodia have similarly liberal
provisions, reflecting a strong governmental interest in population
control." 4 India requires only the justification of contraception
failure as a basis for legal abortion.0 5
Singapore places few restrictions on abortion within the first
twenty-four weeks of gestation, but abortions are limited to women
who are citizens of Singapore, wives of citizens of Singapore, or
women who have resided there for more than four months.30 6
Despite the booming sex tourism industry, Thailand has a
surprisingly restrictive policy on abortions.3 7 The law prohibits
abortions except to protect the life, physical health or mental health
of the mother or when the pregnancy is the result of rape or
incest.30 ' Despite criminal penalties, abortion is relatively common
and the law is rarely enforced.30 9
Islamic prohibitions on abortion severely limit the availability
of abortion in most Middle Eastern Countries. Turkey, a secular
state, has among the most permissive laws, allowing abortion upon
demand within the first ten weeks of pregnancy.310 However,
married women must obtain the consent of their husbands, unless
their life is immediately at risk. After ten weeks, an abortion may
be performed only to save the life or health of the woman or in cases
of fetal impairment." Despite permissive abortion within the first
ten weeks, a requirement that only obstetrician/gynecologists (or
family practitioners under their supervision) perform abortions
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
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severely limits their availability, due to a shortage of specialists in
many areas of the country.312
Bahrain has few time or consent restrictions on abortion, but
requires the approval of a panel of physicians.313 Qatar permits
abortion to save the life, physical, or mental health of the woman
and in cases of fetal impairment, but not for cases of rape or
incest.314 A panel of physicians must also approve the procedure.1 5
In cases of fetal impairment, both spouses must agree to the
abortion.316 Saudi Arabia, host to the largest contingency of Air
Force personnel in the Gulf region 17 allows abortion only to protect
the life or physical or mental health of the mother under uncodified
principles of Islamic law.3" ' The Government has promulgated a
resolution permitting an exception within the first forty days of
pregnancy. Under this resolution, a panel of three medical experts
may approve an abortion if necessary to accomplish a legal benefit
or to prevent an expected harm (presumably to avoid divorce or
illegitimacy), but may not approve an abortion in cases of hardship
in child rearing, simple cases of the parents feeling they have
enough children, or for economic reasons. 3" Abortion requires the
consent of the woman and her husband or guardian.32 °
Kuwait allows abortion only when necessary to preserve the life
or health of the mother and in cases of fetal impairment.321 Three
Islamic physicians must approve the abortion, which may only be
performed with the consent of the mother and her husband or
another person standing in loco parentis.322 Oman, a country with
an increasing United States presence, permits abortion only to save
the life of the mother.323 Despite being a extremely Westernized
Middle Eastern nation, Israel permits abortion only to preserve the
life or health of the mother, in cases of rape or incest, and in cases
of fetal impairment.3 24 A woman seeking an abortion must have the
approval of a committee of two physicians and a social worker, and
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Air Force Personnel Center Website, at http://www.afpc.randolph.af.mil/
demographics (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
318. United Nations, supra note 263.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
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must have the abortion at one of twenty-eight certified public or
private hospitals. In sum, most Middle Eastern countries heavily
restrict access to abortion because of the general prohibition on
abortion under Islamic law.
Other areas of the world house smaller populations of
airmen.325 Most South and Central American countries allow
abortion only to protect the life or health of the mother and in cases
of fetal impairment, rape, or incest.326 Policies range from absolute
prohibitions in Chile and El Salvador to abortion on demand in
Cuba and Guyana. 327  African national policies on abortion
generally reflect the cultural legal tradition. Egypt and Libya, as
Islamic countries, prohibit abortion except to preserve the life of the
woman.321 Sudan, Morocco, and Algeria permit abortion upon
presentation of a health justification. 9 South Africa, with its
European legal tradition and rape problem, allows for abortion on
demand. Most other African countries do not allow for abortion
on demand, but permit-it when there is a risk to the health of the
mother or fetal impairment.331 Generally, the stronger the Islamic
tradition correlates with a more restrictive policy on abortion.
In sum, abortion policy and availability vary widely around the
world. Common determinative factors are population pressure, a
Western legal tradition, an Islamic religious and legal tradition, the
strong influence of the Catholic Church, and the availability of
modern medical facilities. Yet, while the majority of airmen outside
the Middle East live in countries permitting abortion, significant
obstacles to access remain even for these troops.
C. Practical Restrictions-Abuse, Expense, Distance,
and Regulation
In addition to legal restrictions, Air Force women face several
practical restrictions on exercising their right to an abortion,
including the threat of domestic violence, expense, distance,
availability of leave, and the Air Force's twenty-four week rule in
325. Air Force Personnel Center Website, at http://www.afpc.randolph.af.mil/
demographics (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
326. United Nations, supra note 263.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
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curtailing assignments.332 The military services have a documented
higher rate of domestic abuse than the general population.33 In
general, pregnant women are more likely to suffer from domestic
abuse, and women with unintended pregnancies have two and a
half times the risk of suffering domestic violence than those with
intended pregnancies.3  Military physicians, despite being the
group preferred for victims to report domestic violence to, tend to
recognize, document, and treat domestic violence the least
effectively of any group of health providers. 5 Military physicians
are less likely to address women's concerns about domestic violence
than any other health provider in the military medical system. 36
Considering the institutional neglect for abortion referral
procedures, a military woman faces a substantially worse outlook
than a similarly situated woman in a civilian medical facility. A
civilian woman is much more likely to receive counseling regarding
domestic violence during pregnancy and to be provided the option
of an abortion by her physician. As TRICARE does not cover
abortion services except in the case of threat to the life of the
mother, a military woman seeking an abortion must pay for it on
the local economy. While an early term abortion in the United
States usually runs $200-$400, the cost of an abortion and related
care can reach several thousand dollars overseas or later in the
pregnancy. 337 A few states provide abortion funding for Medicaid-
eligible women, but most military members and spouses do not
qualify for reasons of income and alternative health insurance
coverage through TRICARE . 3 8 Distance can present substantial
limitations as well. As explained above, at many United States
bases, a woman would have to travel quite a distance to access
abortion services. Overseas, where abortion may not be available
332. AFI 44-102, § 2.17.1, Community Health Management (Nov. 17, 1999), at http://www.
e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/44/afi44-102/afi44-102.pdf.
333. S.J. Brannen et al., Spouse Abuse: Physician Guidelines to Identification, Diagnosis,
and Management in the Uniformed Services, 164 MIL. MED. 30 (1999).
334. Julie A. Gazmararian et al., Violence and Reproductive Health: Current Knowledge
and Future Research Directions, 4 MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH J. 2 (2000); J. Mezey et. al.,
Domestic Violence and Pregnancy, 314 BRITISH MED. J. 1295 (1997).
335. Gazmararian, supra note 334.
336. Id. This is not to say that military physicians are happy with this, or with their
colleagues in general. In a 1993 RAND study, A third of military physicians rated
themselves less than even somewhat satisfied with the quality of their peers. Only 19% were
satisfied with salary and 27% with practice efficiency. R. Kravitz et al. Satisfaction and
Dissatisfaction in Institutional Practice: Results from a Survey of U.S. Military Physicians.
158 MIL. MED. 41 (1993).
337. Id.
338. National Abortion Federation, at http://www.prochoice.org (last visited Apr. 4, 2003)
(compiling a current list of states providing such funding).
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at all, the woman may have to pay for a trip back to the United
States to obtain the service.
While the Air Force provides its members with thirty days of
leave a year, it does not require commanders to grant any
particular leave request. 39 The regulation encourages commanders
to grant leave liberally, but gives them virtually unchecked power
to deny or cancel leave for reasons of military necessity or for the
general reason of in the interest of the Air Force. 4 ° Non-emergency
civilian medical care does not toll leave provisions, so a member
must have accumulated enough leave time to spend when obtaining
an abortion.3 ' A commander may grant an emergency "advance of'
leave for emergencies or urgent personal situations as determined
at his or her discretion. 42 The emergency leave program generally
provides travel expenses for overseas members to the extent
necessary to return the member to the nearest point in the
continental United States.343
Upon advice from a military health care provider, the
commander may also grant convalescent leave as medically
necessary for the member's or fetus' health and safety, a provision
that does not appear to contemplate voluntary abortion.344 The
military commander also need not release a member from a remote
location until the pregnancy has progressed to twenty-four weeks
of gestation. 45 The regulations essentially give a commander the
ability to block a member's access to abortion by denying leave. As
a practical matter, such an action could only be effective overseas
or at a remote location. However, even in the continental United
States, commanders can exercise a considerable amount of power
in making access to abortion difficult for a military member.
Even a military spouse or dependent can face significant
obstacles. While military leave does not pose a problem for them
and they do not generally accompany members in remote locations,
local prohibitions, travel expenses, and language barriers can still
prevent a woman from accessing abortion services, especially when
confronted with opposition from a spouse or parent. A military
spouse may attempt to avail herself of the Early Return of
339. AFI 36-3003, § 4.1.2, Military Leave Program, (Apr. 14, 2000), at http://www.e-
publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/36/afi36-3003/afi36-3003.pdf.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. at § 6.5.
343. Id.
344. Id. at § 6.4.
345. AFI 44-102, § 2.17.1, Community Health Management (Nov. 17, 1999), at http://www.
e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/44/afi44-102/afi44-102.pdf.
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Dependents (ERD) program, a program that pays for a military
family member's return to the United States under limited
circumstances. 346 These include situations where the military
family member is embarrassing to the United States Government,
prejudicial to order, morale, and discipline in the command, cannot
be protected because of adverse public feeling in the area or because
of force protection and anti-terrorism considerations, or has
divorced the military member or had a change of custody for
minors.347 Unfortunately, this process generally takes several
weeks and necessarily involves the member's chain of command.348
Minor children of military members generally lack access to this
program, as they cannot invoke the provision regarding divorce,
leaving them in the difficult position of returning to the United
States through their own resources.349 If the family member cannot
return to the United States, she must seek an abortion from a
practitioner in the local economy, which may prohibit abortion
altogether, present insurmountable language barriers, or present
significant transportation difficulties.
The General Accounting Office (GAO) also found deficiencies in
military women's health care. In May 2002, the GAO published a
report finding rough equality between the Department of Defense
health plan and civilian plans in terms of women's health; however,
the report questioned commanders' understanding of women's
health needs and reported military women's concerns about access
issues.35 ° While women had the same overall satisfaction with
TRICARE as men (7.8/10), some women in overseas locations were
concerned about their access to health services.35' In particular,
women were concerned about the availability and quality of the
services and the English fluency of the medical personnel treating
them.352 These factors led to some delays in treatment until the
beneficiary could return to a United States treatment facility. 353 At
346. The Early Return of Dependents program is authorized by the Joint Fed. Travel
Regulations 1 J.F.T.R. USJ-1, 1 (2002), available at http://www.dtic.mil/perdiern/jftr/jftr-
c5.txt (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. U.S. Gen. Acct. Off.,Defense Health Care: Health Care Benefit for Women Comparable
to Other Plans, GAO 02-602 (May 2002), at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02602.pdf (last
visited Apr. 4, 2003) [hereinafter Comparable Health Care].
351. Id. at 12.
352. Id. at 14-15.
353. Id. See also, U.S. Gen. Acct. Off., Defense Health Care: Resources, Patient Access, and
Challenges in Europe and the Pacific, GAO/HEHS-00-172 (Aug. 2000), at http://www.
defensehealth.net/reports/GAOHEHS00172.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
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times, the remote nature of the assignment meant that the
beneficiary had to engage in lengthy consultations with the State
Department to find a qualified medical provider.354 The GAO
reported problems in the United States as well, with beneficiaries
in rural areas having difficulty accessing medical care, especially
specialty care. "' While the report did not explicitly address access
to abortion services, 5 6 the GAO noted that "in some parts of South
Dakota, a 2-hour drive is considered routine, and in Alaska, all
patients are transported to the lower 48 states for certain types of
care."
357
Women in deployed environments had even greater
difficulties.3" Deployed women reported several problems,
including limited health care services and supplies, little privacy,
and concerns about whether their confidentiality would be
maintained.359 Supplies to ensure reproductive health, including
feminine hygiene products and birth control pills, were often
available only in forms different from what the patient is used to.
360
For instance, women who routinely used tampons had to change to
sanitary napkins, and women using birth control pills containing a
particular mix of hormones often had to change to another pill with
a different hormone, or a different form of contraception entirely.
3 61
This could lead to increased fertility levels, a serious concern for
military commanders. Women seeking obstetrical care in military
treatment facilities expressed a higher level of dissatisfaction than
their civilian counterparts. 362 Of the women surveyed, twenty-six
percent expressed dissatisfaction with their obstetrical care at
military treatment facilities, compared twenty-two percent for
civilian facilities.363 Women specifically complained of unhappiness
354. Id.
355. U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Health Care: TRICARE's Civilian Provider
Networks, GAO/HEHS-00-64R (Mar. 2000), at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01620.pdf(last
visited Apr. 4, 2003) [hereinafter Military Health Care].
356. Abortion services are outside of TRICARE's funding purview.
357. Military Health Care, supra note 355, at 12. For instance, because TRICARE's
reimbursement rates are so low, no qualified OBGYN could be found to perform
amniocentesis for pregnant women in Alaska.
358. U.S. Gen. Acct. Off., Gender Issues: Medical Support for Female Soldiers Deployed
to Bosnia, GAO/NSIAD-99-58 (Mar. 1999), at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99058.pdf
(last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
359. Id. at 8-10.
360. Id. at 10-11.
361. Id.
362. In 2000, DOD conducted a survey to determine beneficiary satisfaction with inpatient
care during childbirth at 20 MTF's. GAO reports the results in GAO 02-602. Comparable
Health Care, supra note 350.
363. Id.
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with coordination of care, physical comfort, respect for their
preferences, emotional support, involvement of family and friends,
information and education.364 While the data demonstrated only a
small difference in satisfaction, the results prompted Congress to
pass a law allowing women to elect to have their obstetrical care at
a civilian facility starting in 2003.365
In response to the GAO studies, the Department of Defense
(DOD) self-reported concerns that military commanders did not
adequately understand women's health issues. 6 Specifically, the
DOD felt some commanders lacked knowledge about what health
care services were available, when this care should be accessed, and
the need for such care.367 The DOD found that the Air Force and
Army lacked programs for educating commanders on these issues,
and the Navy's education efforts were not comprehensive.368 The
DOD commented that this ignorance contributed to women's
unwillingness to access women's health services, as they felt that
their commanders would perceive them as seeking special
treatment." 9
While the GAO reports did not address abortion issues, the
concerns expressed by military women regarding women's health
issues clearly apply to access to abortion as well. The access to
medical specialists issue for rural beneficiaries translates into
difficulty in finding an abortion provider within a reasonable
distance. Overseas, the problems finding any qualified provider are
magnified because of the specialized training required to perform
abortions. Finally, the DOD's own admission that military
commanders do not understand women's health issues serves to
underscore the access to abortion problem. If women feel they
cannot speak with their supervisors regarding everyday
reproductive health issues, they will have even greater reservations
bringing up the issue of abortion. Ironically, the DOD's own
concerns about the military readiness of female troops, primarily
regarding pregnancy rates in deployed locations, are compounded
by their failure to provide adequate contraception and abortion
services in deployed locations.
364. Id.
365. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-107, § 735,
115 Stat. 1012 (2002). See also Zahn Telephone Interview, supra note 227.
366. Comparable Health Care, supra note 350, at 14.
367. Id. at 16-17.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 18.
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D. Conclusion
Women in and accompanying members of the Air Force face
more barriers to abortion services than their civilian counterparts.
In the United States, the remoteness of many Air Force facilities
and the failure of many facilities to meet their regulatory
obligations impedes access. Even when compared to their civilian
peers in fairly remote United States locations, military women face
the additional difficulties of obtaining leave and locating a provider
without a referral. Overseas, statutory prohibitions on performing
abortions in military facilities, and hostile or ambivalent local
conditions present even greater problems. While the Air Force
maintains an officially neutral policy towards abortion, individual
commanders can exercise their power to actively prevent access in
individual cases.
V. RECENT CHALLENGES TO CHAMPUS/TRICARE REGULATIONS
Two recent Federal District Court cases successfully challenged
the CHAMPUS/TRICARE restrictions in abortion funding in the
instance of anencephalic fetuses. These two challenges, one in
Massachusetts and one in Washington State, addressed the rational
basis of the regulations as applied in the case of a fetus that has no
meaningful chance at life. While these cases were the first to
directly challenge Congress' resolution of the issue in Section 1093,
earlier attacks on funding and counseling issues have failed. Thus,
the cases probably do not, standing alone, represent a move to
reverse these earlier precedents in their entirety, but are still
important as successful as-applied challenges.
A. Anencephaly Background Information
Anencephaly is a condition in which a fetus or child fails to
develop most basic brain structures. 7 ° These brain structures are
necessary for the child to have more than a very short life.371 Only
thirty-two percent of anencephalic fetuses reach full term and are
370. Anencephaly itself means "no brain". WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
5 (Philip Babcock Gove, Ph.D., ed. 1986)
371. Center for Disease Control defines anencephaly as "a fatal birth defect that happens
when the neural tube does not fully close at the top. As a result, part of the skull and brain
do not form properly." Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Folic Acid Excite
Program, at http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/folicacidexcite/Files-in-use/anenc.htm (last visited
Apr. 4, 2003).
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born alive. 372 Fewer than two percent survive longer than seven
days, even with intensive medical support.373 They never attain
consciousness, as they lack the necessary brain structures to
become self-aware.374
Anencephalic fetuses have a unique status, both under the law
and from a bioethical standpoint. While state laws vary, parents
may generally opt to terminate life support without fear of
accusations of medical neglect, as the child lacks the brain
structures necessary to achieve consciousness and cannot maintain
circulation and respiration without substantial medical
assistance. 5  In 1984, Congress enacted the Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act, which required that the states set
certain standards for the removal of life support from disabled
children. 376 The implementing regulations for the Act require states
to prohibit the removal of life support from disabled children, with
three exceptions: (1) when the infant is chronically and irreversibly
comatose, (2) when the provision of such treatment would merely
prolong dying, not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of
the infant's life-threatening conditions, or otherwise futile in terms
of the survival of the infant, or (3) when the provision of such
treatment would be virtually futile in terms of the survival of the
infant, and the treatment itself under such circumstances would be
inhumane. 7  Because anencephalic children lack any chance of
consciousness, they meet these criteria and may be removed from
life support.378
However, parents may also insist on full resuscitation and
medical support, which generally must be provided upon request by
any Medicare/Medicaid certified facility under the Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act.3 79 With full life support,
anencephalic children can live up to two months."' They are
physiologically capable of being organ donors.81 The use of
anencephalic neonates as organ donors to save other children was
so controversial that the American Medical Association changed its
372. Britell v. United States, 204 F. Supp. 2d 182, 185 (D. Mass. 2002).
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107 (2003); 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15 (2003).
377. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15 (2003).
378. For a discussion of how the regulations can be applied, see HCA, Inc. v. Miller, 36
S.W.3d 187 (Tx. Ct. App. 2000).
379. 42 U.S'C. § 1395dd; In re Baby K., 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
825 (1994).
380. Britell, 204 F.Supp. 2d at 185.
381. Id.
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position twice before coming to the conclusion that their use was
ethically permissible.3 2 Even their status as living or dead varies
depending on the philosophical definition of life. Definitions that
require higher brain activity tend to find that anencephalic children
do not meet the'requirements for life, while definitions that require
only brainstem activity usually define them as alive when provided
artificial respiratory and circulatory support.
Women who carry anencephalic fetuses face a heightened risk
to their own health, including increased risks of placental abruption
and subsequent complications.383 Most anencephalic fetuses must
be artificially stimulated in order to deliver, as the fetus lacks the
adrenal glands necessary to stimulate birth.384 This causes
additional risks to the mother, including a possible allergic reaction
to the induction drugs, and an increased risk of injury during the
birth. 5
B. Britell v. United States-A Successful "As Applied" Challenge
to Section 1093
Against the inauspicious backdrop ofMaher, McRae, and Rust,
two recent cases successfully challenged the CHAMPUS/TRICARE
funding regulation as applied to anencephalic children.386  The
plaintiffs in both cases argued that the regulation lacked a rational
basis when applied to the case of anencephalic fetuses. Both
challenges were successful, and CHAMPUS/TRICARE was forced
to fund the abortions.
In 1994, Maureen M. Britell was a 28-year-old housewife
residing in Sandwich, Massachusetts.387 She was a devout
Catholic.8 8 As a teenager, she even joined her parents in picketing
an abortion clinic.38 9 Mrs. Britell had married an Active Guard and
Reserve (AGR) F-15 pilot in the Massachusetts Air National Guard
382. Am. Med. Ass'n, Code of Medical Ethics, § E-2.162, at http://www.ama-
assn.org/apps/pfonline/pfonline?f n=browse&doc=policyfiles/CEJA/E-2.162.HTM (last
visited Apr. 4, 2003).
383. Britell, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 185.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Britell v. United States, 204 F. Supp. 2d 182, 185 (D. Mass. 2002); Doe v. United
States, C02-1657z (U.S.D.C. 2002) (Order granting Plaintiffs Motion for a Temporary
Restraining Order).
387. Thanassis Cambanis,Amid Sorrow,A Shift on Abortion Mother Back Procedure, Wins
Battle Over Insurance, BOSTON GLOBE, June 11, 2002, at B1. Mrs. Britell now campaigns full
time for Voters for Choice, a pro-choice organization. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id.
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and was thus eligible for CHAMPUS coverage as the spouse of an
active duty military member.39 °
In 1994, six months into her second pregnancy, Mrs. Britell and
her husband went to her doctor for a sonogram. 391 The sonogram
revealed that her fetus was anencephalic.392 She was also informed
that she would have to end the pregnancy artificially, through
abortion or induced labor at full term, as the child would not
spontaneously deliver.3 93 Mrs. Britell discussed the matter with her
husband and her priest, who advised her to terminate her
pregnancy. 394 The procedure, an induced labor abortion at New
England Medical Center, required Mrs. Britell to endure thirteen
hours of labor before the fetus was expelled.395
The procedure cost almost $5,000. New England Medical
Center submitted a claim to CHAMPUS/TRICARE for
reimbursement, which was denied. 396  The hospital sued Mrs.
Britell and her husband for the cost of the procedure, and the
parties eventually settled for $4,000.397  In 1997, Mrs. Britell
appeared before the Massachusetts Legislature to advocate against
a ban on late term abortions. Later that year, on Mother's Day, as
she left church, antiabortion protestors confronted her.398 In
response to these personal attacks, she decided to advocate more
strenuously, and brought suit in the Federal District Court for the
District of Massachusetts, represented by a private attorney hired
by The Center for Reproductive Law and Policy.399 She alleged that,
as applied in the case of an anencephalic child with no chance at
life, the regulatory prohibition on coverage for abortion contained
in the CHAMPUS/TRICARE regulation violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. °°
United States District Judge Nancy Gertner heard the case.
She issued an initial decision (largely repeated in her second
opinion) with four conclusions." ' First, she held that McRae did
390. Id.
391. Britell, F. Supp. 2d at 182.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 185.
394. Id. at 186.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Sue Reinert, Abortion Ruling Seen as a Symbolic Victory, PATRIOT LEDGER, June 1,
2002, at 16.
398. Cambanis, supra note 387.
399. Id.
400. Britell v. United States, 150 F. Supp. 2d 211, 226 (D.C. Mass. 2002).
401. Id.
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not prohibit an as-applied challenge to the regulation.4 °2 Second,
she found that CHAMPUS/TRICARE's policy of funding abortion for
ectopic pregnancy, as well as treatment of spontaneous, missed, or
threatened abortions, was rationally related to the legitimate public
interest of maternal health.4 3 Next, she felt that there were
significant unbriefed legal issues "regarding the state interest
advanced by denying funding for termination of anencephalic
pregnancies, while allowing funding for other medically necessary
pregnancy services. 40 4 Finally, she found that there were questions
of fact remaining about the age of the fetus and its impact on
CHAMPUS/TRICARE's decision-making process.40 ' She asked the
parties to submit additional briefg before she would decide the
validity of the regulations.4 6
Two weeks later, Judge Gertner issued her final decision,
finding that CHAMPUS/TRICARE lacked a rational, legitimate
interest in denying coverage under the circumstances of the Britells'
case. 4 7 In the opinion, Judge Gertner restated the facts of the case
and her earlier upholding of the validity of an as-applied challenge
as distinct from the kind of facial challenge attempted in the Rust
case.408 As her rationale, she cited City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, a case in which a facially valid zoning ordinance had
been used to invidiously discriminate against a protected class (in
that case, the mentally retarded). 409 She went on to reject
CHAMPUS' call for deference to the legislature's funding decisions,
noting that in this case, the medical expenses of carrying the child
to term would almost certainly have exceeded the costs of
terminating the pregnancy.410
Next, Judge Gertner addressed CHAMPUS' argument that the
distinctions drawn in the case did not amount to "invidious dis-
crimination" under the Equal Protection Clause.411 Without a
finding of invidious discrimination, CHAMPUS argued, the rational
basis requirement did not apply.412 Finding a lack of Supreme
Court precedent on the definition of "invidious", she turned to the
402. Id.
403. Id. at 220-23.
404. Id. at*226.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Britell, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 182.
408. Id. at 187.
409. Id. (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
410. Britell, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 196.
411. Id.
412. Id.
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common meanings, which include, "of an unpleasant or objection-
able nature" and "causing harm or resentment".413 She went on to
conclude:
In any event, however one defines "invidious," there is invidious
discrimination lurking here. Women of means, who can afford
to obtain abortions without insurance coverage, will not be
deterred by CHAMPUS' policies regarding anencephaly, while
poorer women might. Such women will be forced to wait nine
months before seeking medical termination of a pregnancy. And
at the end, their fetuses' chances of viability will be no greater
after nine months than they would have been in the first
trimester. Indeed, since the fetuses' potential for life is
ephemeral, one impact of CHAMPUS's regulation - in addition
to the financial one - is to stigmatize such women for their
legitimate moral choice to terminate their anencephalic
pregnancies. As justification for a regulatory enactment, this
function runs afoul of both law and reason.414
Finally, Judge Gertner addressed CHAMPUS' concern that her
decision would start society down the "slippery slope" to
euthanasia.41 In rejecting this argument, she found a clear
distinction between anencephaly, a condition inconsistent with life,
and other chromosomal or birth defects like Down's Syndrome,
which might be life threatening but are not, in themselves,
inconsistent with life.4"' She noted that the current "Baby Doe"
regulations supported her view by permitting the non-treatment of
anencephalic children and fetuses.1 7
Judge Gertner concluded by finding no rational basis for failing
to cover abortions of anencephalic fetuses:
There is no rational justification for CHAMPUS' refusal to fund
Britell's abortion of her anencephalic fetus. Through the
funding power the government seeks to encourage Britell and
women similarly situated to suffer by carrying their
anencephalic fetuses until they are born to a certain death. This
rationale is no rationale at all. It is irrational, and worse yet, it
is cruel.418
413. Id. at 196 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 480 (7th ed. 1999)).
414. Id. at 197.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 198.
417. Id.
418. Id.
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She granted the Britell's motion for summary judgment, compelling
CHAMPUS/TRICARE to pay for the abortion.419 The United States
has not appealed. The decision represented a toe in the door for the
abortion rights lobby, but CHAMPUS/TRICARE had yet to be
forced to cover an abortion of an anencephalic child in advance.
C. Doe v. United States-Following in Britell's Footsteps
A Washington State Federal District Court quickly adopted the
Britell decision and applied it prospectively.42 Jane Doe, a 19-year-
old woman married to an active duty Navy E-3,4 2 ' found out on July
12, 2002, that her sixteen week-old fetus was anencephalic.422 Her
Navy physicians told her that she should abort the fetus to protect
her health, but that they could not perform the procedure.423
Mrs. Doe and her husband sought to have the procedure at the
University of Washington Medical Center, but could not afford it on
her husband's meager Navy pay and her own salary from the Navy
Exchange.4 24 The University of Washington requested payment in
advance from TRICARE, which denied the request, citing the
specific denial of coverage for abortion for anencephalic fetuses in
the CHAMPUS regulation.4 25  Mr. and Mrs. Doe then sought
assistance through the Northwest Women's Law Center and
eventually reached Vanessa Soriano Power, an attorney who agreed
to take the case for free.426 Upon discovering the Britell decision,
Ms. Power filed a petition in Federal District Court for a temporary
restraining order requiring TRICARE to cover the procedure.427
At a hearing on August 9, 2002, Dr. Tom Easterling, a professor
of obstetrics and gynecology at the University of Washington
Medical Center, testified for Mrs. Doe.42 Dr. Easterling provided
the grim facts of anencephaly-the fetus would never achieve
consciousness and has "no potential for human interaction. 4 29 He
419. Id.
420. Doe v. United States, C02-1657Z, (U.S.D.C. 2002) (Order granting Plaintiffs Motion
for a Temporary Restraining Order).
421. E-3 is one of the lower enlisted ranks. Susan Paynter, With All Hope Lost, a Legal
Angel Appears, SEArrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 26, 2002, at E-1; Doe, Order at 1.
422. Doe, C02-1657z at 1.
423. Paynter, supra not 421, at E-1.
424. Id.
425. Doe, C02-1657z at 2.
426. Paynter, supra note 421.
427. Id.
428. Carol M. Ostrom, Judge: Navy Must Cover Woman's Abortion: Everett Mother
Carrying Fetus Lacking Most of Its Brain, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 13, 2002, at B1.
429. Id.
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confirmed that Mrs. Doe faced substantial risks in continuing the
pregnancy with no prospect of any gain.43 ° Another witness
testified that the costs for the abortion would run $2,500 to
$3,000.431
District Judge Barbara Rothstein issued the order the same
day.432 In a short opinion, she found the Massachusetts' court's
reasoning persuasive. The judge found that "[flor the same reasons
elucidated by Britell, this Court concludes that Plaintiff has made
a showing of a strong likelihood of success on the merits of her
claim."433 She also quickly dispensed with the requirement for
irreparable harm needed for a temporary restraining order, citing
four factors from Dr. Easterling's testimony: the greater health
risks in continuing the pregnancy; the potential negative impact of
a cesarean section; the risk of emotional devastation; and a greater
financial cost.
434
The United States appealed the order immediately, but the
United States District Court denied reconsideration.435 United
States District Judge Thomas Zilly said the "'balance of hardships
in this case tips sharply' in favor of the pregnant woman. ''436 The
Department of Justice attorneys replied that the law "reflects a
congressional determination that taxpayer dollars should not be
used to facilitate abortion in any way (absent a threat to the life of
the mother) - even temporarily. ''43' Before Mrs. Doe's attorneys had
a chance to reply to the Government's writ, however, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also denied the
appeal.438
D. Effects of the Britell and Doe Decisions
While the Britell and Doe decisions do undermine the strength
of Section 1093 and the CHAMPUS regulations, they will most
likely not open the door to broader military funding of non-
therapeutic abortion. Maher, McRae, and Rust all support
government restrictions on funding for abortion, and Rust supports
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Doe, C02-1657z at 2.
433. Id. at 3.
434. Id. at 3-4.
435. Carol M. Ostrom, Navy Must Pay for Abortion; Sailor's Wife is Carrying Fetus
Missing Most of its Brain, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 17, 2002, at B2.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id.
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a rather strong intervention into the counseling aspects of
physician-patient relationship. While the two recent decisions
should be viewed as limited, they do have some practical effect.
Arguably, the findings in Doe and Britell could be used to
compel coverage for abortions of anencephalic fetuses of active duty
women in the Districts concerned, or by adoption in other Districts.
These rulings clearly extend to the funding of medical care outside
of military treatment facilities. They do not go so far as to require
performance of abortions in military facilities when the woman's
life in not in danger. Still, a not insignificant number of airmen and
military families are stationed in Western Washington and
Massachusetts. Recent AFPC data show about 1,250 active duty
Air Force women in Washington and about 230 in Massachusetts. 439
The 2000 census data list 9,029 military dependents in Washington
and 2124 military dependents in Massachusetts. 4" While the
United States will almost certainly appeal the disposition in the
Doe case, for the moment military members and spouses who live
in these Districts, and who face or have faced the expenses of the
abortion of an anencephalic child, have at least a limited
opportunity to seek compensation. For women who live outside the
federal court districts, the fact that two separate districts are in
agreement holds out some hope that the policy can be expanded.
For the moment, the cases present little practical hope for
military affiliated women overseas seeking therapeutic abortions
because the scope does not extend beyond the federal court districts
involved. At best, these women could use the decisions to support
internal appeals of denial of coverage for abortions of anencephalic
children. Given that these appeals are heard in the Government-
friendly arena of CHAMPUS/TRICARE, they will almost certainly
be unsuccessful. However, should the Britell and Doe cases be
extended to include therapeutic abortions in non-life-threatening
cases, these women could realize some practical benefit.
The facts of the cases do not lend themselves to extension to
other types of therapeutic abortions. The Britell reasoning
explicitly considers the complete lack of any chance at life for the
fetus.441 The Government's interest in protecting life can not,
therefore, outweigh the woman's interests in protecting her health.
439. Air Force Personnel Center Website, at http://www.afpc.randolph.af.mil/
demographics/demograf/ENLSTATES.html and http://www.afpc.randolph.af.mill
demographics/demograf/OFFSTATES.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
440. Air Force Personnel Center Website, at http://www.afpc.randolph.af.mil/
demographics/demograf/DPSARTFY00 DEPEND_3.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
441. Britell, 204 F. Supp. 2d 182, 183 (2002).
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When even a chance of life exists for the fetus, the Government has
the rational basis required to support the decision not to fund the
procedure. Thus, the rulings in Britell and Doe do not support a
more general application to instances where some chance of life
exists for the fetus.
E. Legislative Action
The access problems faced by military-affiliated women in
overseas locations recently have attracted congressional interest.
In June 2002, Senators Patty Murray of Washington and Olympia
Snowe of Maine introduced an amendment44 2 to the Defense
Authorizations Act443 to repeal Section 1093(b).444 The amendment
essentially reverses the 1996 changes to Section 1093 by striking
section (b), the section preventing the performance of abortions in
military hospitals.445 Sen. Sam Brownback of Kansas spoke against
the amendment. He pointed out that a similar amendment had
failed in 2000, reminded the Senate that military physicians
generally refuse to perform abortions, and noted that the services
all had policies requiring them to observe the laws of the host
nation regarding abortion.44 Thus, the amendment would have no
practical effect.447 The amendment passed the Senate on a vote of
52-40, but the House bill had no such provision. The Conference
Committee eventually reconciled the two versions, eliminating the
provision allowing abortions in military facilities.445
While this bill, as passed by the Senate, would have eliminated
the statutory prohibition on performing abortions, it would by no
means have ensured access for women overseas. As noted by Sen.
Brownback, most military physicians exercised their regulatory
right not to perform abortions after President Clinton's order in
1993.44' As military physicians continue to be more conservative
than their civilian counterparts, there seems little reason to believe
their attitudes have changed over the intervening years. Thus even
442. S.Amend. 109th Cong. 3927, § 708, CONG. REC. S5829 (2002) (Sen. Murray), available
at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:SP03927: (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
443. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, S. 2514, 109th Cong. (2002),
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:SN02514: (last visited Apr. 4,2003).
444. Carl Hulse, Senate Votes To Let Soldiers Overseas Pay ForAbortion, N.Y. TIMES, Jun.
22, 2002, at A8.
445. See 10 U.S.C. § 1093(b) (2003).
446. S. Amend. 3927, 109th Cong., 148 CONG. REC. S5829-30 (2002) (passed the Senate).
447. Id.
448. H.R. 4546, 109th Cong., Conf. Rep. No. 107-772 (2002).
449. S. Amend. 3927, 109th Cong., 148 CONG. REC. S5829-30 (2002) (passed the Senate).
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without Section 1093(b), military women would continue to have
greater access issues than civilians.
At the time this article was sent to print, the United States
Senate had passed a ban on partial birth abortions and the House
was about to vote on the bill. 5 ° President George Bush has
indicated that he will sign the bill if it passes both houses of
Congress.45' As the bill, as presented in the House, does not contain
language allowing for a partial birth abortion to protect the health
of a woman, it is likely to be overturned in that regard. 52 It is also
susceptible to challenge as lacking constitutional authorization
under the reasoning of United States v. Lopez, as it attempts to use
the Commerce Clause to an issue with questionable applicability to
interstate commerce. 5 Partial birth abortion is one method of
delivering an anencephalic fetus, although not the only one.
VI. CHALLENGES AND POLICY CHANGES REGARDING MILITARY
WOMEN AND ABORTION
The Air Force faces risk of legal challenge regarding its
abortion policy, but could easily address most access concerns
through regulatory changes. The prohibition on therapeutic
abortions is susceptible to challenge under the Stenberg and Casey
"undue burden" analysis, especially for women overseas. 54 Even
without judicial challenges, the Air Force should consider minor
changes to its policies on leave and Early Return of Dependent to
address the obvious disparities in access to abortion services faced
by Air Force women.
A. Possible Legal Challenges
An as-applied challenge to Section 1093 might succeed for a
woman seeking a therapeutic abortion overseas. Roe, Casey, and
Stenberg all support a woman's right to a therapeutic abortion in
the third trimester, even when there is no threat to the life of the
woman. 55 Additionally, the cases, especially Stenberg, hold that a
450. 108th Congress, S. 3, H.R. 760 status, available at http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited
Apr. 4, 2003).
451. Statement of the President Regarding Partial Birth Abortion, March 13, 2003,
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030313-3.html (lastvisited
Apr. 4, 2003).
452. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 931.
453. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
454. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 931.
455. Id.; Casey, 505 U.S. at 901; Roe, 410 U.S. at 113 (1973).
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facially neutral regulation may unduly burden a specific woman's
right to seek an abortion." 6 While Section 1093 facially applies
only to abortions in military treatment facilities and appears to
leave open the possibility of an off-base abortion, the realities of
overseas service foreclose this option in many circumstances.
Another potentially successful attack would be to challenge the
prohibition on therapeutic abortions in overseas military treatment
facilities as lacking a compelling basis, given the presence of
exceptions for cases of rape or incest.
The practical obstacles faced by women overseas differ
substantially from those in the United States. As discussed above,
overseas women may face insurmountable obstacles, both legal and
practical, to an abortion on the local economy. By framing the
question as an as-applied challenge, a woman could argue that the
prohibition on therapeutic abortions in military treatment facilities
effectively forecloses her only option for an abortion and
unnecessarily risks her health. While this argument has been
rejected in the United States, in overseas areas the circumstances
differ substantially. Exacerbating the increased barriers faced by
women overseas, the Air Force bears some portion of fault for
putting the woman in the situation, as the Air Force presumably
assigned her or her family member there. Combining these facts
with the lack of any Supreme Court precedent against an as-applied
challenge to a therapeutic abortion, a sympathetic court might rule
in the woman's favor.
In such a challenge, a plaintiff could argue that the United
States has no compelling interest in prohibiting therapeutic
abortions in military treatment facilities. If she could prove her
only practical option was to seek an abortion at the military
treatment facility because of hostile local conditions, she could then
rely on Stenberg to support her case. The relevant portion of
Stenberg's holding boils down to the proposition that the
government cannot discriminate between the life and the health of
the mother in making abortion policy.457 Both are sufficient to
override even the compelling nature of the governmental interest
in protecting fetal life.
Challenges to military policies from military members face
significant legal obstacles. Both the Feres bar and the Federal Tort
Claims Act discretionary function exception block a traditional tort
456. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 931.
457. Id. at 921-22.
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suit. 5  However, Frontiero v. Richardson supports military
women's access to the court to seek redress for discriminatory
policies.459 In this case, a female Air Force lieutenant successfully
challenged a federal law that discriminated against male
dependants of active duty members.46 ° A case challenging the
military's leave policy as discriminatory as applied to pregnant
women seeking abortions should therefore at least have a hearing
in federal court.
Exacerbating the situation, a military woman's commander
holds veto power over her ability to get leave to have an abortion,
limited only by his determination of military necessity and the best
interests of the Air Force.461 By virtue of command authority, a
commander has a power over a woman that the federal courts do
not permit her husband, partner, or even parents to have. 62 The
regulation is facially neutral, but does not provide for mandatory
grants of leave.4 63 Even approval for convalescent leave ultimately
lies in the commander's hands. 64 Unlike a judicial bypass for a
minor, no statutory authorization exists for a judicial bypass of the
commander's decision. Her sole avenue of redress is through the
chain of command. As noted by the GAO report on Kosovo, that
chain of command has proven itself to be uninformed regarding the
needs of women's health. 65
Arguably, the Air Force might owe an affirmative duty to assist
women in exercising their reproductive freedoms. Despite the
language in Harris and Rust concerning the government's lack of
any duty to facilitate the exercise of constitutional rights, the
Supreme Court has held in other circumstances that the
government may not unduly inhibit the exercise of those rights.
Therefore, according to the Second Circuit, in the unique
circumstances of military service, the government must assist a
member of the military in the exercise of those rights. 66 In Everson
v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court wrote, "Neither [a state
nor the federal government] can force nor influence a person to go
458. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2003).
459. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
460. Id. at 690-91.
461. AFI 36-3003, § 6.1 Military Leave Program (Apr. 14, 2000), at http://www.e-
publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/36/afi36-3003/afi36-3003.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
462. Casey, 505 U.S. at 901.
463. AFI 36-3003, at § 4.1.2.
464. AFI 36-3003, at § 6.4.
465. U.S. Gen. Acct. Off., Gender Issues: Medical Support for Female Soldiers Deployed
to Bosnia, GAO/NSIAD-99-58 (March 1999), at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99058.pdf
(last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
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to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. 467 In Katkoff v. Marsh,
the Second Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the military
chaplaincy.46 8 Judge Mansfield wrote for the Court, noting,:
if the Army prevented soldiers from worshipping in their own
communities by removing them to areas where religious leaders
of their persuasion and facilities were not available it could be
accused of violating the Establishment Clause unless it provided
them with a chaplaincy since its conduct would amount to
inhibiting religion.46 9
No case explicitly extends the reasoning of Katkoff to the exercise
of reproductive rights in the military, but the analogy is clear. In
removing women from an environment in which they could readily
obtain an abortion, the military has arguably affirmatively denied
them a constitutional right and must therefore provide an
affirmative remedy.
Crafting a judicial remedy for the access problem presents
difficulties. In any given case, a court could order the command to
grant the woman leave. This would both impinge on the usual
prerogatives of the executive branch and leave the underlying
problem unsettled. A court order requiring the Air Force to grant
leave to any pregnant woman requesting leave to have an abortion
would put the court in the position of dictating policy to the
military, which the courts have quite reasonably been reluctant to
do.47° Invalidating Section 1093 to the extent that it prohibits
abortions in military facilities would not surmount the problem of
finding a physician willing to perform the abortion. Thus, the
courts are not the ideal place to solve this problem.
B. Possible Statutory and Regulatory Changes
A better solution would be to change Section 1093 or the leave
regulations. In light of Stenberg, Section 1093 appears to be on
shaky ground with regard to governmental discriminations between
the life and the health of the mother in making abortion policy.471
While the military gains some measure of protection by claiming
that the statute merely regulates health insurance, the realities of
467. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
468. Katkoff, 755 F.2d at 237.
469. Id. at 232.
470. See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
471. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 931.
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overseas service often mean that military health care is the only
available health care. In addition, while military obstetricians do
not support providing elective termination services, they do support
providing therapeutic termination services. A change to Section
1093 and its affiliated regulations to allow therapeutic abortions
would adequately address the unique access issues faced by Air
Force women, at least with regard to protecting their health.
In the absence of Congressional action on the issue, the Air
Force could amend the leave and emergency leave instructions to
explicitly address the needs of pregnant women seeking abortions.
Requiring commanders to grant medical leave to women seeking
abortions, when available in the local economy, and emergency
leave to return to the United States when services are not available,
would prevent at least active duty Air Force women from suffering
a disproportionate burden interference with their reproductive
freedoms because of their service. Military family members present
a more difficult problem.
The current regulatory approach to military family members
does not adequately address their needs. The Early Return of
Dependents program does not help much, as it was not designed for
this purpose and the Air Force cannot unilaterally change it. At
present, the only real solution a commander can offer is revoking
command sponsorship, which effectively banishes the family
member back to the United States indefinitely. A regulation
providing travel funding for elective medical treatment in the
United States could effectively enhance dependent access to
reproductive services. Such a regulation, however, should not rely
on any discretionary decision of the military member or his or her
commander.
VII. CONCLUSION
Air Force women still face significant obstacles in exercising
their right to abortion services. The Air Force, while publicly
maintaining a neutral stance on abortion rights, has failed to
provide adequate practical safeguards to ensure that military and
military family members can exercise this right. The Air Force's
continued lack of interest in enforcing the requirement for a referral
procedure undermines women's access to abortion. The most
reasonable solution to this problem would be to simply adhere to
the standard stated in the AFI, and to provide written guidance for
abortion referrals in the form of a Medical Group Instruction.
While the Air Force has no affirmative duty to support abortion in
412 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 9:351
any given case, its medical group commanders have the regulatory
duty to back this up with an appropriate referral system.
While recent cases have expended CHAMPUS funding for
abortions in the case of anencephalic fetuses, these cases do not
extend funding to all therapeutic abortions. Further, while current
legislation might eventually permit abortions in overseas military
facilities, it would not provide staff willing to perform abortions, the
critical facet of the problem. CHAMPUS and Air Force policy will
likely remain static on abortion rights. Enforcement of this policy
should adjust to protect the reproductive rights of Air Force women.
Finally, regulatory changes could effectively enhance Air Force
women's access to abortion. For active duty members, minor
changes to the leave and emergency leave regulations would offer
airmen seeking abortion services the opportunity to access these
services in the United States. A more comprehensive funding travel
regulation for elective medical procedures in the United States
could adequately protect the access rights of military family
members seeking abortion services. By enacting such regulatory
changes, the Air Force could effectively reduce, although not
eliminate, the increased barriers to access faced by military women.
